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In Chapter 1: Research has shown that government spending can affect GDP 
growth rates, yet there is no comprehensive study that looks at how a country’s 
choice of political institutions affects government spending. Using a panel of 92 
democracies, this paper focuses on how the choice of regime type (presidential, 
parliamentary or mixed), legislative chamber structure (bicameral or unicameral), 
legislative chamber size, and electoral rules affect the level of government 
spending. The results show that the relationship between legislative chamber size 
and government spending is linear in unicameral countries but non-linear in 
bicameral countries, plurality electoral rule is always associated with less spending 
than any other type of electoral rule, and unicameral and bicameral countries 
should not be modeled together. 
In Chapter 2: In a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1900-2007, 
we test the degree to which institutions and geography affect country income. 
Using a new instrument, we find strong evidence that both institutions and 
geography are important determinants of country income. However, the penalty for 
economically unfavorable geography is much smaller than the potential benefits 
from good institutions. The coefficient estimates do not vary significantly when 
there are changes in the number of countries included in the analysis; the results for 
institutions are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. 
In Chapter 3: Latin America’s turbulent political history and marked 
dependence on commodity exports naturally raises questions about their 
xii 
interdependence. Constructing a new panel dataset from 1919-2000, I examine how 
international prices for Latin America’s principal exports influence national 
political stability. The data show a significant effect of commodity prices on 
political instability. This significance holds when disaggregating each country’s 
commodity price index into point source commodities (e.g. natural resources and 
plantation crops) and diffuse commodities (e.g. small farm production and 
livestock) and these results are consistent when using a count model. Further 
disaggregation reveals that the point source effect is primarily driven by increases 
in mineral prices.
1 
Chapter 1: Legislatures, Leaders, and Leviathans: 
How Constitutional Institutions Affect  




The level of government spending has been shown to have negative effects 
on per capita GDP growth in many contexts – in both rich and poor countries and at 
both the state and national levels (Barro, 2003; Engen and Skinner 1992; de la 
Fuente 1997; Fölster and Henrekson 2001; Afonso and Furceri 2008; Cooray 2009; 
Ghosh Roy 2009).
1
 The persistence of this relationship between government 
spending and growth highlights the importance of understanding the determinants 
of the level of government spending. One obvious group of determinants of 
government spending is the set of political institutions (and their characteristics) a 
country has in place. In an effort to better understand these factors, I study how 
various political institutions in a panel of 92 democracies affect the size of 
government spending. Understanding how political institutions can affect economic 
growth (directly or indirectly) is an important topic as countries are establishing 
new political institutions (e.g. South Sudan and Libya). These countries stand to 
benefit from knowing what types of institutions are conducive for growth. 
                                                 
1
 My measure of government spending is government consumption as a percentage of real GDP per 
capita taken from the Penn World tables (Heston et al., 2009). Government spending and 
government consumption are not the same thing, however, data on government spending is limited 
and, because the data on government consumption is available for a greater number country-years, 
the literature on government size typically uses government consumption as a proxy of government 
spending. 
2 
Previous literature has examined how the structures of political institutions 
affect the level of government spending. Regime type (presidential versus 
parliamentary), electoral rules (plurality versus proportional representation), 
legislative structure (unicameral versus bicameral) and legislature size are among 
the political institutions and characteristics that have been studied in relation to 
level of government spending (Persson and Tabellini 1999, 2002, 2003; Bradbury 
and Crain 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Ricciuti 2004; Gilligan and Matsusaka 
1995, 2001). However, there has yet to be a comprehensive investigation of how all 
of these institutions considered together affect the level of government spending.  
In this paper, I incorporate a broad range of political institutions/ 
institutional characteristics – regime type, electoral rules, legislative size, and 
legislative structure – into my analysis. I also allow for a greater degree of 
heterogeneity in these political institutions and characteristics than the existing 
literature. When looking at electoral rules for the legislature, the existing literature 
ignores the possibility that the upper chamber may have a very different set of 
electoral rules than the lower chamber. I include both lower chamber and upper 
chamber electoral rules to see what effects the electoral rules of each chamber have 
on government spending. I also take into account the existence of a third regime 
type that lies between presidential and parliamentary systems – mixed presidential-
parliamentary systems. Lastly, I allow for the possibility that the effect of 
legislative chamber size on the level of government spending may be non-linear. 
3 
The results show that there is a distinct non-linear relationship between the 
government share of real GDP and legislative chamber sizes in bicameral countries. 
More specifically, the relationship between the lower chamber size and government 
share of real GDP is cubic while the relationship between upper chamber size and 
government share is quadratic. However, the relationship between unicameral 
chamber size and government share of real GDP is linear which corroborates the 
existing literature (Weingast et al., 1981; Bradbury and Crain 2001). The results 
consistently show that plurality electoral rule is associated with lower government 
shares of GDP than any other type of rule. There is also statistical evidence that 
unicameral and bicameral countries have different estimated coefficients and 
therefore should be estimated separately.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the 
literature on the effect of political institutions on government spending. Section 1.3 
outlines the definition of democracy chosen for this paper and presents the model 
and the data. The main results are presented in Section 1.4, and Section 1.5 presents 
the results of some robustness checks. Lastly, Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Literature on Political Institutions 
1.2.1 Chamber Size and Structure 
Much of the literature dealing with legislative chamber size is centered on 
the law of 1/n which was formally laid out by Weingast et al. (1981). The intuition 
is that if there are n electoral districts, each represented by one legislator, then the 
tax burden, or cost, of any project to each district is one n
th
 of the total cost. 
4 
However, the full benefit from each project goes to one district. So the benefit, 
which is concentrated, is larger than the cost, which is spread over all of the 
districts. More formally the benefit to district i from project x,      , is greater than 
the 1/n
th
 cost that it bears, 
 
 
       As a result, each legislator will favor spending 
up to the point where the marginal benefit to his or her district equals the marginal 
cost to that district:   
     
 
 
      . From this rule we can see that the optimal 
level of spending for each legislator increases with n, the number of electoral 
districts.  
This idea suggests that for every additional legislator, the level of 
government spending should increase linearly (i.e. steadily). However, there is no 
research that I am aware of, on the particular functional form of this relationship. Is 
the relationship always constant, increasing at a decreasing amount, or at an 
increasing amount?  
There are a few papers that test the law of 1/n, especially focusing on US 
state legislatures. Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001) find that in US states, the 
level of government spending in the 20
th
 century increases with the size of the 
legislature. Additionally, they find that the size of the upper chamber is the source 
of the strongest positive effect on spending. Bradbury and Crain (2001) point out 
that the underlying assumption of the law of 1/n is that there is one chamber 
making the spending decisions (i.e. unicameral legislature). If this is the case, the 
use of US states is not truly testing the law of 1/n as 49 of the 50 states have 
bicameral legislatures. They, instead, test the theory using a cross country panel of 
5 
35 countries, roughly 2/3 of which are bicameral and 1/3 which are unicameral, by 
including the size of each chamber in the bicameral countries and the size of the 
only chamber in the unicameral countries all together in their analysis. They find 
that the size of the lower and unicameral chamber has a positive (linear) effect on 
spending but that the size of the upper chamber in the bicameral structure has a 
negative (linear) effect on spending thereby lessening the effect of the law of 1/n 
present from the lower chamber. However, they still use bicameral legislatures in 
their specification and assume that bicameral and unicameral countries can be 
grouped together.  
None of the papers testing the law of 1/n have considered the possibility of 
a non-linear effect between legislature size and government spending. The 
implication of a linear relationship is that for every additional legislator, the 
subsequent increase in government spending is always the same and that spending 
is always increasing. However, there is reason to believe that this relationship 
cannot hold indefinitely. It is more likely that there is a limit to the increase in 
spending as a result of an increase in the size of the legislature. Once a certain size 
in reached, the level of spending either stays constant or decreases. With this kind 
of relationship, there is also the likelihood that increases in spending as a result of 
additional legislators do not increase at a constant rate. In other words, instead of a 
linear relationship, we would expect to see a non-linear relationship between 
legislature size and government spending that has a maximum point at the larger 
end of the chamber sizes in lower or unicameral chambers.  
6 
1.2.2 Electoral Rules 
There are different types of electoral rules in place throughout the world. 
Since I am interested in legislatures that are accountable to the population, I only 
consider democratic countries (as defined by Przeworski et al., 2000) that have 
free, fair, and competitive elections for the legislature and the executive. This 
means that at the very least, the lower chamber in a bicameral system and the only 
chamber in a unicameral system must be elected by the people. However, the upper 
chamber can be filled either through appointment, direct or indirect elections
2
. The 
executive (i.e. president or prime minister) has to be either directly elected (as in 
some presidential systems) or indirectly elected by elected officials (as in 
parliamentary systems or the Electoral College in the US).  
Research focusing on the electoral rules of the legislative chamber(s) looks 
at the different types of constituencies and their effect on different types of 
government spending (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 2002, 2003; Milesi-Ferretti et. 
al., 2002; Scartascini and Crain, 2002). Different electoral rules create different 
constituencies for politicians. Proportional representation (hereafter PR) electoral 
rules create nationwide constituencies that are unified either by social class, age, 
ethnicity, or other types of overarching characteristics, while plurality electoral 
rules create geographically defined constituencies. As a result, politicians in PR 
systems target specific subgroups of the national population, while those in 
plurality systems target groups within a pre-defined geographical area (Milesi-
                                                 
2
 Appointments to upper chambers can be made by presidents, prime ministers, minority groups,  
and lower levels of government to name a few of the ways.  
7 
Ferretti et al., 2002). Based on the difference in constituencies, we would expect to 
see that in PR systems, the level of demographic specific government spending – 
such as transfers – would be increasing as the number of legislators increases. 
Similarly, in plurality system, we would expect the level of geographically targeted 
governments spending – such as goods and services – to be increasing with 
legislature size. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) and Scartascini and Crain (2002) find 
evidence that countries with PR electoral rules have higher spending on transfers 
while countries with plurality electoral rules have higher spending on public goods.  
However, the literature that focuses on the electoral rules of the legislature 
only look at the unicameral or lower chamber electoral rules, either ignoring the 
existence of an upper chamber or assuming that the upper chamber has the same 
electoral rules as the lower chamber.  In reality, the rule used for the upper chamber 
is often different than the rule for the lower chamber. For instance, there are many 
upper chambers that are not directly elected by the people but are instead indirectly 
elected by state legislatures, minority groups, or appointed – as in many 
Commonwealth countries. The literature on bicameralism stresses the fact that the 
upper chamber serves as a check on the lower chamber (Riker 1992; Bradbury and 
Crain 2002). However, not all upper chambers work the same way. Depending on 
the type of constituency, which is influenced by the electoral rules, the upper 
chamber may have different types of influence on the lower chamber. It may indeed 
check the lower chamber, by having completely different constituents, or it may not 
work as a check at all and instead support the lower chamber, by having the same 
8 
set of constituents. Because of their disparate nature, it is important to allow for this 
discretion when examining the effect that upper chamber electoral rules have on the 
lower chamber’s legislative powers. 
 The existing literature only tests the effects of different types of lower 
chamber electoral rules and do not account for upper chamber electoral rules, 
chamber structure, or legislature size which, as mentioned above, also have effects 
on government spending.   
1.2.3 Regime Type  
Regime type refers to the system of government – presidential, 
parliamentary, or mixed presidential-parliamentary. Presidential systems have a 
head of government that is elected separately from the legislative branch creating a 
distinct separation of powers where the executive’s ability to stay in office is not 
subject to continued support by a majority of the legislative chamber (Cheibub et 
al., 2004). In this system, the legislative body is forced to bargain with the 
president in order to assure the passage of legislation (Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman, 2005).
3
  In contrast, in parliamentary systems the head of the 
government is elected by the winning coalition within the parliament and his or her 
ability to stay in power is subject to continued support of the legislature. In this 
system there is no clear separation between the head of the government and the 
legislative branch, as the head of the legislative body is also the head of the 
government and has considerable power to initiate and push legislation forward 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003).  
                                                 
3
 Unless there is a supermajority that can overturn a presidential veto as in the US. 
9 
The middle ground between these two systems is a mixed presidential-
parliamentary system (e.g. the French Fifth Republic). In this system, there is 
typically both a president that is not subject to continued approval by the legislative 
branch and a prime minister elected by the winning coalition in the parliament, 
whose tenure is contingent upon continued support from the parliament. Within this 
category there are different degrees of power sharing with some presidents having 
the ability to dissolve the parliament while in other cases the president is elected by 
the parliament. However, there is still a separation of power with the president 
often having the ability to veto legislation (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
In presidential systems, as opposed to parliamentary systems, there is a 
good possibility that the president is from a different party than the majority 
coalition or party in the legislative branch. Even if they are from the same party the 
agenda of the executive branch and the legislative branch may not be the same. 
This can lead to less government spending as the legislative chamber takes time in 
writing spending legislation that will not be vetoed by the president. In 
parliamentary systems, the prime minister is essentially the leader of the winning 
coalition and, as mentioned above, has considerable power to initiate legislation 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003). This makes the passage of legislation easier in stable 
parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. This reasoning suggests that 
presidential systems will have lower levels of spending than parliamentary systems. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2002,  2003) find support that presidential systems, 
ceteris paribus, always have lower levels of government spending.  
10 
The literature, however, places mixed system countries into either the 
parliamentary country grouping or the presidential country grouping (Scartascini 
and Crain 2002; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Ricciuti 2004; Persson and 
Tabellini 1999, 2002, 2003). Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that the 
classification of mixed systems is a difficult task and beyond the scope of their 
study due to the many manifestations of mixed systems and the difficulty in finding 
information to accurately classify them. Since their work, however, there has been 
work done on the classification of mixed systems (Cheibub et al., 2010).  
1.3 Data and Model 
In this paper, I focus on democratic institutions. In order to identify 
countries that are democratic, I must first choose a single definition of democracy 
from the multitude that exist in the literature. I choose the dichotomous measure of 
democracy laid out in Przeworski et al. (2000) and recently updated by Cheibub et 
al. (2010).
 4
  According to this measure, a country is classified as a democracy 
provided that: (1) the chief executive is popularly elected or elected by a body that 
was popularly elected, (2) that the legislature is popularly elected, (3) the elections 
have more than one party participating (i.e. contestation), and (4) that there is 
alternation of power under the electoral rules (Przeworski et al., 2000; Cheibub et 
                                                 
4
 Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) expanded the 2000 dataset up to 2008 and reclassified a few 
countries based on the political events that occurred in the country after 2000. The complete dataset 
can be found on Cheibub’s website.  
11 
(1) 
al., 2010). This dichotomous definition of democracy is the most appropriate for 
this work because it specifically focuses on electoral requirements and outcomes.
5
  
My sample is comprised of democratic countries for the years 1975 through 
2007. In order to be included in the sample, a country must have been classified as 
a democracy for any eight consecutive years within the 33 years the dataset covers.
6
 
I estimate an unbalanced panel regression using pooled ordinary least 
squares (POLS) for the 92 countries that comprise the sample for a total of 2,115 
country-years.
7
 To begin with, I estimate the following model which is a modified 
version of Bradbury and Crain’s (2001) main specification.  
                                                        
                                                  
The dependent variable, Git, is the government share of real GDP from the 
Penn World Tables version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009).  Nuniit is the size of the 
unicameral chamber and Nlowerit and Nupperit are the sizes of the lower and upper 
chambers (and their squares and cubes in the non-linear cases).
8
 For unicameral 
                                                 
5
 Other measures of democracy that have been used in the literature include using a cutoff value to 
denote democracy in the Polity IV democracy variable, the Polity score, or the Gastil index (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2003). The lists of countries that qualify as democracies using these alternative 
measures of democracy (and a reasonable cutoff value) are similar to the list of countries classified 
as democratic using the Przeworksi et al. (2000) measure. 
6
 One very notable omission is the United Kingdom. It meets the requirement for democracy and all 
of the other economic and political data is available except for the size of the upper chamber – The 
House of Lords. That is, the House of Lords has not had a set number of seats historically. 
7
 A list of all the data sources used can be in an earlier version of the paper that can be found in the 
author’s website. 
8
 A full list of the countries included along with the starting and ending year for each, whether they 
are unicameral, bicameral or switched between and the average size of each chamber for the period 
of inclusion can be found in an earlier version of the paper that can be found in the author’s website 
12 
countries, Nlowerit and Nupperit are equal to zero. For bicameral countries, Nuniit is 
equal to zero.  
HouseElect.Ruleit is a dummy which equals one if fifty percent or more of 
the house is elected through a plurality rule and zero if it is elected through 
proportional representation. SenateElect.Ruleit contains four dummy variables, 
controlling for the rule that fills fifty percent or more of the upper chamber and one 
controlling for unicameral countries with no upper chamber. The included electoral 
rules are plurality, appointed, indirectly elected, PR and the excluded category is no 
upper chamber. The vector RegimeTypeit contains three dummy variables 
controlling for the system of government. The three regime types are presidential, 
parliamentary, and mixed presidential-parliamentary systems.
9
 Presidential and 
mixed presidential-parliamentary are included in the regression and the excluded 
regime category is parliamentary systems.  
The vector Xit is a set of control variables. It includes the log of real GDP 
per capita lagged one period, log of population, population growth, log of trade 
openness, military expenditure, percentage of population under 15 years of age, 
percentage of population over 65 years of age, and a set of dummy variables 
denoting the country’s legal origins. GDP per capita is included to control for 
Wagner’s law which states that government spending increases with GDP (Persson 
                                                 
9
 There is concern that the selection of constitutional structure is not a random choice. There is a 
concentration of presidential countries in the Americas and parliamentary countries in former British 
colonies. Persson and Tabellini (2002) compare the results from conventional regresssions against 
the results using quasi-experimental matching methods and find that the results do not change. 
Therefore, I do not try to control for this potential problem of endogeneity. In addition, I control for 
legal origin which is heavily determined by colonial origin (La Porta et al., 2008) 
13 
and Tabellini, 2003). Openness, calculated as exports plus imports divided by GDP, 
is included to control for Rodrik’s (1998) finding that more open economies have 
larger governments in the form of increased government safety net. The log of 
population is included to control for country size and economies of scale in the 
production of government services (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). Population 
growth is included to control for the short-run demand for goods and services, such 
as highways, that are needed to accommodate rapid growth (Gilligan and 
Matsusaka, 1995).  Military expenditure, percentage of the population under the 
age of 15, and over the age of 65 are included to control for other forms of 
government services. Countries that spend large amounts on their military tend to 
have larger government shares of government spending. The age of the population 
also has an effect on the types and amount of government services that need to be 
provided. If there is a large young population, more spending on schools is needed 
while a larger elderly population means that more spending on health care is 
needed. The last controls are a set of dummy variables denoting the country’s legal 
origins. There are four legal origins: English Common Law, French Civil Law, 
German, and Scandinavian.
10
 Legal origin has been shown to affect external 
finance which is likely to affect the amount of government spending and is also 
highly correlated with colonial origin (La Porta et al., 2008).
11
 The regression also 
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 In the regressions, English Common Law is the excluded dummy. 
11
 Instead of using regional dummies, I use Legal Origins which are correlated with colonial origin. 
In the sample of 92 countries, 45 have French Legal Origins (Latin American countries, former 
Spanish and French Colonies and a few former Soviet States), 15 have German Legal Origins, 5 
have Scandinavian Legal Origins, and 27 have English Legal Origins (mostly former British 
Colonies and Common Wealth Countries). 
14 
(2) 
includes time fixed effects, τt, to control for time specific effects. Country fixed 
effects are not appropriate in this specification because some of the regressors are 
time invariant.  
I first estimate the model and test whether unicameral and bicameral 
countries can be pooled together by running a Chow test for the appropriateness of 
grouping.
12
 The results of the tests reject the hypothesis, at the one percent 
significance level, that bicameral and unicameral countries share the same set of 
coefficients.
13
 In other words, the results of the Chow test suggest that bicameral 
and unicameral countries should not be grouped together. The majority of the 
variation between unicameral and bicameral countries is mainly coming from the 
control variables in the specification. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics separated 
by chamber structure. Unicameral countries tend to be poorer, more open to trade, 
and smaller in terms of population. They also tend to have higher levels of 
government spending than bicameral countries.  
Following the results of the Chow test, I estimate equation (1) separately for 
unicameral and bicameral countries. The separate equations are: 
For Unicameral:  
                                                     
           
For Bicameral:  
                                                 
12
 I also test the quadratic (in chamber size) specification of this model and find the same results. 
13
 The results from this test are available upon request. I ran the test for the linear specification, the 
quadratic specification and the combination of terms that I use later on in the paper. In all cases, the 
test rejects the null that the coefficient for unicameral are zero (i.e. that unicameral and bicameral 
countries have the same coefficients). 
15 
(3) 
                                               
                                                  
The included variables are defined the same as for equation (1). The major 
difference here is that the unicameral equation does not include any bicameral 
variables and the bicameral equation does not include any unicameral variables.
14
 
The next step is to select the optimal specification in terms of legislative 
chamber size. That is, to see if the models are linear or non-linear in chamber size. 
To test for this, I use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) which allows me to 
compare models in order to find the model that best fits the data.
15
 According to the 
criterion, the optimal unicameral model is squared in the size of the legislative 
chamber and the optimal model for bicameral model is cubic in the size of the 
lower chamber and linear in the size of the upper chamber.
16
 In what follows I 
report only the results for the optimal model (i.e. linear for unicameral and cubic-
squared for bicameral) 
                                                 
14
 Keep in mind that in the bicameral equation, SenateElect.Ruleit now has one less dummy variable, 
as the dummy for no upper chamber is no longer valid for this vector. The excluded category in this 
estimation is upper chambers elected through PR. 
15
 For the unicameral specification, I compare the linear, quadratic, and cubic models in chamber 
size and find that the linear model is the optimal choice (i.e. the model with the smallest BIC value). 
For the bicameral grouping, I compare the 9 models that comprise the possible combinations of 
lower and upper chamber sizes raised up to the third power.  
BIC is also known as the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) after the author Gideon Schwarz. 
The optimal dimensionality of the model is the specification that yields the lowest BIC value. For 
more detail on the test refer to Schwarz (1978).  
16
 These results hold up even when I reduce the sample by averaging the dependent variable in order 
to try to smooth out the business cycle which I do in the robustness section later in the paper. 
16 
1.4 Results   
1.4.1 Unicameral 
Column 1 in Table 1.2 shows the results for the unicameral model.
17
  The 
coefficient on legislature size is positive and significant. This result is in line with 
the law of 1/n and the literature’s findings that additional legislators increase the 
size of government spending (Weingast et al., 1981; Bradbury and Crain 2001). For 
example, if the size of the legislature increases by one standard deviation, 
government share of real GDP increases by 1.2%, ceteris paribus.  
The presidential and house electoral rule coefficients, both negative and 
significant, support the existing literature (discussed in the previous section). That 
is, in comparison to parliamentary systems and PR systems, both presidential and 
plurality systems have lower government shares of real GDP. More specifically, 
presidential systems’ government share of real GDP is smaller than parliamentary 
systems’ share by 2.9% and plurality electoral rule results in 4.7% smaller 
government share of real GDP than PR electoral rule. The coefficient on mixed 
presidential parliamentary systems is not significantly different from zero for the 
full sample of unicameral country years. This suggests that mixed systems, in 
unicameral countries, have similar levels of government spending as parliamentary 
systems.  
As for the control variables, the lagged log of real GDP per capita is 
negative and significant. However, the literature suggests that it should be positive 
                                                 
17
 I only report the optimal equation based on the BIC in the unicameral and bicameral results. The 
results for other specifications are available upon request. 
17 
based on the idea that demand for government goods and services increases with 
income. The coefficient on the log of population is negative and significant 
showing that as population increases, the government share of real GDP decreases. 
This result follows Gillian and Matsusaka’s (1995) argument that there are 
economies of scale which appear as a negative coefficient on log of population. 
Openness and military expenditure are both positive and significant as expected. 
That is, more open countries have higher levels of government spending due to a 
higher demand for a government provided safety net and higher levels of military 
spending naturally translate into higher levels of government spending (Rodrik, 
1998). Percentage of the population under 15 and over 65 years of age are both 
positive and significant. While the coefficients are not similar, a one standard 
deviation increase in each variable increases government spending by similar 
amounts ( 3.2% for a one standard deviation increase in the % of population under 
15 and by 3.3% for a one standard deviation increase in the % of population over 
65). The last set of controls, the dummy variables for legal origin, are all negative 
and significant. This means that in comparison to English Common Law (the 
excluded variable), having French, German, or Scandinavian legal origins 
decreases the share of government spending. The largest result is for French Civil 
Law origins; countries that have French Civil Law origins have 4.9% less 
government spending than countries that have English Common Law.  
18 
1.4.2 Bicameral 
Column 2 in Table 1.2 shows the results for the bicameral model. The 
coefficients on the lower chamber size show that there is a non-linear relationship 
between the size of the lower chamber and government share of real GDP per 
capita. Panel A in Figure 1 depicts the results of lower chamber size against 
government spending holding everything else at their mean values, and varying the 
size of the lower chamber. 
From the image, we can see that there is a maximum and a minimum 
spending point within the range of real world chamber sizes. The maximum is 
reached at 469 seats and the minimum at 129 seats, ceteris paribus. It is interesting 
to note that almost all of the country years that would fall on the downward sloping 
part of the curve (at the lower end of the chamber sizes) are small countries and/or 
island nations. Smaller countries tend to have lower levels of government spending 
and may be what is driving the initial downward sloping part of the curve.
18
 
The maximum point is well above the average lower chamber size of 235 
seats and outside the one standard deviation band (both of these are depicted in 
Figure 1). Most countries have lower chambers that are smaller than this maximum 
and, most countries fall between the minimum and maximum point on the upward 
sloping part of the curve. Although the slope of the curve is positive for this 
section, there is an inflection point at 300 seats.
 
The increase in government 
spending as a result of an additional legislator, ceteris paribus, increases more than 
proportionally after the minimum of 129 seats up to 300 seats and then increases at 
                                                 
18
 The list of country –years based on chamber sizes can be provided upon request. 
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a decreasing rate until it hits the maximum point of 469 seats. This result suggests 
that, while for most countries there is a positive relationship between lower 
chamber size and government spending, the relationship is not always constant nor 
is it always increasing. The nonlinear specification and the resulting inflection 
points tell a different story than the results for the unicameral chamber. Recall that 
the law of 1/n supports a linear relationship (i.e. always increasing at the same rate) 
and the findings in the unicameral specification followed this relationship. 
However, in the bicameral setting, there is a very strong non-linear relationship and 
the increase in government share of real GDP is not constant.  
The results for the upper chamber also show a non-linear relationship which 
is depicted in Panel B in Figure 1. The government share of real GDP decreases as 
the size of the upper chamber increases up to a point and then increases. However, 
most of the upper chambers in the sample lie on the downward sloping part of the 
graph. There are only five countries that lie above the minimum part of the graph.
19
 
This result supports Bradbury and Crain’s (2002) finding that the upper chamber 
dampens the spending behavior of the lower chamber. 
The electoral rules in this specification are slightly more complicated than 
in the unicameral case because there are two chambers to account for and there are 
more upper chamber rules. Lower chambers can be elected either through PR or 
through plurality. The included dummy for the lower chamber is plurality. Upper 
chambers can be appointed, indirectly elected, or directly elected through PR or 
plurality electoral rules. The excluded dummy variable is PR. The coefficient for 
                                                 
19
 Spain, France, India, Italy, and Japan 
20 
the lower chamber confirms the literature’s finding that plurality electoral rule 
yields lower levels of government spending, ceteris paribus, than PR electoral 
rules. I find a similar and stronger result in the upper chamber. The coefficient 
shows that, holding everything else constant, plurality electoral rule for the upper 
chamber results in 8.3% less government share of real GDP than with PR electoral 
rule. Of all the electoral rules, PR upper chambers (along with appointed upper 
chambers) appear to be the worst in terms of limiting government share of real 
GDP.  
The coefficients on the regime type are not really significant. While the 
coefficient on presidential regime type is negative it is not significantly different 
from the parliamentary systems. The addition to the literature is that the mixed 
presidential-parliamentary system is significantly different than the presidential and 
parliamentary systems (albeit the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level). In 
terms of government share of real GDP, mixed systems have lower shares than the 
other two systems. The existing literature, due to complications in the classification 
of mixed systems, ignores the presence on this third regime type by grouping the 
countries into either the presidential or the parliamentary groups. The results here 
show that mixed systems are actually different than the other two groups and 
should be considered separately.   
Log of real GDP per capita is, once again, negative and significant and 
contrary to what the literature predicts. Openness is positive and significant 
supporting the ideas that more open countries have higher levels of government 
21 
spending due to a higher demand for a government provided safety net (Rodrik, 
1998). Log of population has the expected negative sign but population growth is 
negative and significant in this specification which is contrary to the literature. 
Unlike with unicameral countries, military spending and percentage of the 
population over 65 are both statistically and economically insignificant. However, 
percentage of the population under 15 years of age is negative and significant 
suggesting that a younger population reduces the share of government spending. 
The legal origin dummies are mostly insignificant with German legal origin only 
slightly statistically significant but not economically significant.  
The results in this section suggest that the law of 1/n appears to apply to 
unicameral countries. Bradbury and Crain (2001) made the argument that the 
underlying assumption behind the law of 1/n is that one legislative chamber makes 
the spending decisions. In other words, that the law of 1/n requires the legislative 
structure to be unicameral. The results here confirm that in unicameral chambers, 
the law of 1/n does hold.  For bicameral countries, however, the relationship 
between legislative chamber and government share of real GDP is not linear. In 
fact, the relationship between the size of the legislative chambers and government 
spending is significantly non-linear. So the law of 1/n does not apply to bicameral 
chambers. The results do show that upper chambers do work to dampen the effects 
of the lower chambers’ spending.  
The results in this section may be driven by extreme values in the data (i.e. 
countries with large legislative chambers). In the next section I perform some 
22 
robustness checks to see if the results are robust to the removal of outlying chamber 
sizes. 
1.5 Robustness Checks 
 To test for the possibility of extreme values influencing the results, I re-
estimate the unicameral and bicameral models dropping country years whose 
legislative chamber sizes are larger than two standard deviations from the mean. 
1.5.1 Unicameral  
The results in the previous section show that there is a strong positive linear 
relationship between legislature chamber size and government share of real GDP. 
However, there are a wide range of chamber sizes in the sample with extreme 
values in the upper end of the chamber sizes. Column 2 in Table 1.3 shows the 
results when estimating the unicameral model for only the country years with 
chamber sizes within two standard deviations of the average chamber size (i.e. 
unicameral sizes less than 378 chairs).
20
 For these country years, the coefficient for 
unicameral chamber is no longer significant. Almost all of the other variables in the 
model increased in absolute magnitude.  
 It appears that the coefficient on unicameral chamber size is sensitive to 
extreme values in the sample. This really calls into question the validity of the law 
of 1/n. Not only does it not apply to bicameral chambers it does not appear to be 
robust to the exclusion of extreme chamber size values.  
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 Excluded countries – Hungary, Turkey, Ukraine and Indonesia. 
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1.5.2 Bicameral  
 Dropping extreme values for bicameral countries is a bit more complicated 
since it has to be done for the lower and upper chambers. Columns 3 through 6 in 
Table 1.3 show the results for the various estimations of the bicameral model.  
I first address the extreme values in the lower chamber. Column 4 shows 
the results when estimating the bicameral model for only the country years with 
lower chamber sizes within two standard deviations of the average lower chamber 
size (i.e. lower chamber sizes below 655 chairs).
21
 Notice that all of the lower 
chamber size coefficients are still significant and have similar (slightly larger) 
magnitudes as the original specification (shown in Column 3). A notable difference 
is that the coefficients on presidential and mixed systems are now highly significant 
suggesting that countries with presidential and mixed systems spend 2.4% and 
2.5% less, respectively, than parliamentary systems.   
Column 5 shows the results of the bicameral model when removing all the 
country years with upper chamber sizes larger than two standard deviations past the 
average upper chamber size (i.e. excluding chamber sizes greater than 267 
chairs).
22
 Similar to the results so far, all of the coefficients on the chamber sizes 
remain significant and have similar magnitudes to the original specification. The 
rest of the coefficients also maintained their significance in this subset of the data.  
The last robustness check is to drop extreme values in the both chambers at 
the same time to see if the results still hold up. Column 6 shows the results when 
                                                 
21
 Excluded country – Germany. 
22
 Excluded countries – France and Italy. 
24 
dropping the lower and upper chambers that are larger than two standard deviations 
from the average. The results are very similar to the original results.  Overall, it 
appears that the results are robust to the exclusion of extreme values in bicameral 
countries. 
1.6 Conclusion  
In this paper I undertake a comprehensive study of the relationship between 
political institutions and level of government spending. I incorporate both the 
political institutions that have been used in the literature and go further by 
accounting for: 1) differences in upper chamber electoral rules, 2) the existence of 
mixed presidential parliamentary systems, and 3) the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship between legislature chamber size and spending. The results show that 
there is a linear relationship between unicameral chamber size and level of 
government spending in unicameral countries. However this result is not robust to 
the exclusion of extreme values in legislative chamber sizes. The results also show 
that there is a non-linear relationship between lower chamber size and level of 
government spending in bicameral countries and the results are robust to the 
exclusion of extreme values. In both types of legislative structures, plurality 
electoral rule is always associated with lower levels of government share of GDP. 
Lastly, when testing to see if bicameral and unicameral countries should be 
grouped together, I find that they should not.  
The results presented here suggest that the political structure and the 
characteristics of the legislative chamber have a significant effect on the level of 
25 
government spending. While countries that have long standing political institutions 
are less likely to change the characteristics of those political institutions in order to 
change the level of government spending, countries that are establishing new 
political institutions (e.g. South Sudan and Libya) stand to benefit from knowing 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Size Unicameral Chamber 0.0107***
(0.0033)
















House Electoral Rule Plurality -4.6652*** -3.1455***
(0.5529) (0.3309)
Senate Electoral Rule Plurality -8.3359***
(0.4923)
Senate Electoral Rule Appointed -0.6314
(0.6286)




Mixed Presidential-Parliamentary 0.7195 -1.3884*
(0.5520) (0.7140)
lagged log of Real GDP per capita -4.8356*** -2.5358***
(0.3904) (0.2980)
log Openness 1.7857* 1.2322***
(0.9213) (0.4343)
log Population -2.3597*** 0.4422*
(0.3378) (0.2676)
Population Growth -0.6908* -0.4002*
(0.3642) (0.2113)
Military Expenditure 0.0043*** 0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0000)
% Pop. Below 15 0.3112*** -0.0901**
(0.0591) (0.0452)
% Pop. Above 65 0.6689*** -0.1462
(0.1246) (0.0955)
French Legal Origin -4.8474*** 0.4399
(0.6194) (0.7486)
German Legal Origin -1.7934* 0.9465*
(0.9695) (0.5021)






Table 2 - Main Results
Gov Share of real GDP
Note: Year dummies not reported to save space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.            







































Table 1. : ain Results 
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Minus Lower and 
Upper Chamber 
Extreme Values 
Size Unicameral Chamber 0.0107*** -0.0055
(0.0033) (0.0045)
Size Lower Chamber -0.0609*** -0.0687*** -0.0592*** -0.0606***
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0195)
(Size Lower Chamber)
2
0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
(Size Lower Chamber)
3
-0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size Upper Chamber -0.0400*** -0.0811*** -0.0459** -0.0825***
(0.0132) (0.0155) (0.0198) (0.0199)
(Size Upper Chamber)
2
0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
House Electoral Rule Plurality -4.6652*** -5.6168*** -3.1455*** -3.5729*** -3.0847*** -3.6326***
(0.5529) (0.5848) (0.3309) (0.3325) (0.3861) (0.3606)
Senate Electoral Rule Plurality -8.3359*** -9.4567*** -8.4057*** -9.3801***
(0.4923) (0.5069) (0.5494) (0.5675)
Senate Electoral Rule App -0.6314 -1.6261*** -0.6099 -1.4400*
(0.6286) (0.6299) (0.6431) (0.7523)
Senate Electoral Rule Indirect -2.3125*** -2.8556*** -2.3204*** -2.9392***
(0.6247) (0.6166) (0.6517) (0.6579)
Presidential -2.8553*** -3.7291*** -1.2813 -2.3711*** -1.2459 -2.3624***
(0.6931) (0.6879) (0.8322) (0.8611) (0.8083) (0.8244)
Mixed Pres.-Par. 0.7195 -0.0387 -1.3884* -2.4613*** -1.2165 -2.4208***
(0.5520) (0.5829) (0.7140) (0.6968) (0.8872) (0.8876)
log of Real GDP per capitat-1 -4.8356*** -5.0649*** -2.5358*** -2.4131*** -2.4988*** -2.4073***
(0.3904) (0.3991) (0.2980) (0.2965) (0.3393) (0.3296)
log Openness 1.7857* 0.4875 1.2322*** 1.8491*** 1.2627*** 1.8377***
(0.9213) (0.9659) (0.4343) (0.4103) (0.4214) (0.4242)
log Population -2.3597*** -2.1487*** 0.4422* 0.7281*** 0.4487* 0.6861**
(0.3378) (0.3408) (0.2676) (0.2697) (0.2673) (0.2692)
Population Growth -0.6908* -0.6126 -0.4002* -0.6291*** -0.4019* -0.6687***
(0.3642) (0.3848) (0.2113) (0.1996) (0.2144) (0.2053)
Military Expenditure 0.0043*** 0.0060*** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
% Pop. Below 15 0.3112*** 0.3145*** -0.0901** -0.0405 -0.0872* -0.0306
(0.0591) (0.0640) (0.0452) (0.0438) (0.0493) (0.0470)
% Pop. Above 65 0.6689*** 0.6663*** -0.1462 -0.0874 -0.1363 -0.0688
(0.1246) (0.1384) (0.0955) (0.0944) (0.1005) (0.0954)
French Legal Origin -4.8474*** -4.9876*** 0.4399 0.7271 0.5309 0.7252
(0.6194) (0.6313) (0.7486) (0.7360) (0.8290) (0.8615)
German Legal Origin -1.7934* -1.4696 0.9465* 1.4771*** 0.8768 1.3260***
(0.9695) (1.0557) (0.5021) (0.5280) (0.5355) (0.5064)
Scandinavian Legal Origin -2.3346*** -1.5855** -0.2442 -0.2753 -0.3861 -0.2613
(0.7768) (0.7604) (0.9226) (0.9169) (1.0390) (0.9742)
Constant 76.6601*** 83.9778*** 37.6634*** 30.2027*** 36.8625*** 30.0000***
(10.3428) (10.6593) (5.7515) (5.8589) (6.3224) (6.2897)
Observations 1,065 1,001 1,050 1,018 984 952
R
2
0.3431 0.3667 0.5142 0.5439 0.5093 0.5396
Note: Year dummies not reported to save space. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
( Extreme Values = 2σ away from mean)




Table 3 - Bicameral Excluding Extreme Chamber Sizes 
Gov Share of real GDP
Bicameral ResultsUnicameral Results








































Table 1.3: Bicameral Results Excluding Extreme Chamber Sizes 
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of Effect of Lower and Upper Chamber Size on 





Chapter 2: Electoral Experience, Institutional Quality,  
and Economic Development in Latin America 
 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
Two hundred and fifty years after the arrival of the Europeans, per capita 
income in parts of the Caribbean and South America actually exceeded per capita 
income of the colonies that would later become Canada and the United States 
(Coatsworth, 2005).
23
 However, in the 19
th
 century, Latin American economies fell 
behind the US and Canada and have never fully recovered. For example, during the 
1800s national income grew so much slower in Mexico that by 1900, average per-
capita income was only 33% of that in the US. While Mexican income began to 
make up ground in the 20
th
 century, such progress came to a halt with the 1980s 
debt crisis. There is a large literature arguing that the Spanish and Portuguese 
colonial legacies must be part of the explanation for the region’s slow growth and 
authors have pointed to factors as diverse as religion, culture, economic ideology, 
and overall institutional development.
24
   
While many of these factors could explain the divergence in development 
between the US and Canada on the one hand and the rest of the Western 
Hemisphere on the other hand, the arguments are harder to make when trying to 
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 According to Maddison’s (2009) figures, Mexico’s per-capita income was 108% of US per-capita 
income in 1700. 
24
 Among other reasons, the different economic paths of the US and Latin America have been 
attributed to cultural differences (MacKay 2006; Andreski 1966), institutions (Coatsworth and 
Tortella 2002; Coastworth 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; North 1989, 1990), economic 
ideology (Lange et al. 2006), initial endowments (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Nunn 2008), 
religion and culture (Grier 1997, 1999; Macauley 1848). 
31 
explain differences among Latin America countries. For example, in 1900 Brazil 
and Peru had similar levels of per capita GDP. In 1956, Peru’s per capita GDP was 
45% larger than Brazil’s. However, by 2000, average per-capita income in Brazil 
was 45% larger than average income in Peru.
25
 These two countries share a similar 
colonial heritage, religion, and culture. So what caused Peru’s income growth to 
outstrip Brazil’s in the early part of the century and what enabled Brazil to not only 
catch up but also surpass Peruvian average income by the year 2000? There is a 
long-standing debate in the growth and development literature about whether 
institutions or geography are more important to income levels.  We investigate this 
question in the Latin American context to try to better answer the question about 
Brazil and Peru that we posited above.  
In this paper, we test how much institutions and geography can explain 
income differences across 18 Latin America countries from 1900 to 2007. We 
make use of a new instrument based on the history of suffrage expansion that 
allows us to use a panel framework.
26
 
We find several interesting results.  First, we show that institutions, 
measured as the level of political constraint on the chief executive, have a positive 
and significant effect on per-capita GDP.  This result is robust to the inclusion 
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 Estimates based on Maddison’s (2009) data. 
26
 The instrument is the depreciated number of years that a country has experienced a particular type 
of suffrage under the conditions of both competitive elections and secret ballots. Since many of our 
countries have experienced periods of no elections (or non-competitive ones), the instruments are 
not merely a point and a time trend. During these periods, there is no new data being added and the 
value of the instruments decreases until a new competitive election takes place. At that point, the 
instrument starts to increase again.  
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country fixed effects and to changes in the number of countries in the sample.
27
 The 
effect of improving institutions by one standard deviation above the regional 
average is an increase in a country’s per-capita GDP of about $2150.  Using an 
alternative measure of institutions, we find that the same exercise raises per-capita 
GDP by about $2550. Thus, institutions are not only a statistically significant 
determinant of income, they also have a large, quantitative effect as well. 
Second, we find that geographic factors also play an important role in 
determining per-capita incomes in the region. Countries that are landlocked, or 
tropical, or are closer to the equator have significantly lower per-capita incomes 
than countries that have coastal access, are more temperate, and are further away 
from the equator. More specifically, we find that the per capita income penalty 
from being landlocked averages $755, the penalty for being tropical averages 
around $1876, and the penalty for moving one standard deviation from the mean 
absolute latitude closer to the equator is around $500.  Based on these estimates, it 
appears that geography has a smaller effect on per-capita income than institutions.  
Thus, in our case at least, we can say that the answer to whether geography or 
institutions are more important to development is that they both play a role but 
institutions play a bigger role. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
literature on institutions, geography, and growth in general and also with respect to 
Latin America. Section 3 explains why we think Latin America is a perfect 
laboratory in which to study the questions of income, institutions, and geography.  
                                                 
27
 Refer to Appendix 1 for definitions of each of these institutional measures.  
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Section 4 presents the data and the methodology. In Section 5 we discuss the main 
results as well as the jackknife results and Section 6 concludes.  
2.2 Literature Review  
The effect of geography and institutions on income has been hotly debated 
in the development literature in the last couple of decades. Przeworski (1993), 
Brunetti (1997) and Jütting (2003) survey the political institutions and growth 
literature and find the results to be inconclusive. Some studies find that political 
institutions have a positive effect on income growth, while others find a negative 
effect. Others find that political institutions do not significantly affect income at 
all.
28
 More recently, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds that the quality of institutions 
positively affects economic growth and Catrinescu et al. (2009) find that places 
with higher quality of political and economic institutions are more likely to see 
long term growth from remittances than places with with lower quality of 
instituitons. 
The literature studying the link between geography and country income 
finds that landlocked countries and countries with tropical climates have lower 
income levels on average than coastal, temperate countries (Gallup et al., 1999; 
Bloom, et al. 1998; Mellinger, et al. 2000; Sachs 2001). However, once institutions 
and geography are included in a single regression, the results again become less 
conclusive. For example, Acemoglu, et al. (2001) and Rodrik, et al. (2004) show 
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 From these surveys Barro (1989), Scully (1988), and Pourgerami (1991) and Decker and Lim 
(2008) are examples of works that find a positive relationship, Barro (1991), Knack and Keefer 
(1995) and Alesina, et al. (1996) find a negative relationship and Levine and Renelt (1992), 
Easterly, et al. (1993), Helliwell (1994) and de Haan and Siermann (1995) find no relationship 
between political institutions and economic growth.  
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that, once they instrument for institutions, the effects of geographic variables are no 
longer significant and in some cases have unexpected signs. On the other hand, 
McArthur and Sachs (2001) and Naudé (2004) show that both institutions and 
geography are important determinants of growth.  
Another argument in the literature is about the persistence of historical 
institutions and their effect on current economic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2002) argue that colonial institution have an influence on the quality of current 
institutions, where quality is measured as the risk of appropriation of private 
property by the government. Areas where colonizers set up extractive institutions 
are more likely to have poor contemporary institutions.  Regions that were settler 
colonies, where Europeans brought their families and constructed good institutions, 
are less likely to suffer from arbitrary government expropriation.   
Along the same lines, Dell (2010) finds that the forced labor system of 
mining in colonial Peru, called the mita, has had a long-run effect on development.  
Areas that were strongly affected by the mita now have lower education levels than 
the national average, more subsistence agriculture, and are generally less integrated 
into the national road network. Other works have found a similar link between 
colonial legacies and economic outcomes in other parts of the world. Nunn (2008) 
finds that the slave trade has negative persistent effects on the countries where 
slaves originated. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that British colonial land tenure 
rules have present day effects on the level of investment in different areas of India. 
While some of the historical institutions literature is region specific, much of the 
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literature on institutions and income focuses on a large-N cross section of countries 
from around the world. In the next section we discuss why a regional focus is 
beneficial.    
2.3 Why Latin America? 
In any empirical estimation, the ideal sample is one where the observations 
come from the same data generating process and there is enough variation in the 
independent variables to be able to correctly estimate their effects. Large-N studies 
pool data from very heterogeneous countries and there is a possibility that the data 
do not share a common set of coefficients. Grier & Tullock (1989), for instance, 
demonstrate that countries from different geographic regions do not share a 
common set of coefficients in growth regressions.  
Limiting the sample to a single region that shares a similar colonial 
background increases the possibility that the observations come from the same data 
generating process. It also helps to control for a multitude of other factors that have 
been shown to affect income such as religion (Catholicism is the dominant religion 
in the region) and legal origin (all countries in our analysis have French legal 
origins (La Porta et al., 1997)). Of course, the risk of focusing on a single region is 
the possibility that there is no interesting variation in the explanatory variables. 
However, we believe that Latin America is sufficiently varied, both geographically 
and institutionally, to make it a good laboratory. For instance, the region covers a 
large north-south range, starting with Tijuana, Mexico at the north-most point of 32 
degrees latitude down to Ushuaia, Argentina, located at -54.8 degrees latitude. 
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There is also large variation in climate zones, ranging from temperate Argentina 
and Chile to the rainforests of Venezuela and Central America.  
The region is also institutionally diverse, both across countries and across 
time. One common measure of institutions is the level of executive constraint, a 
variable measured on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7, with higher numbers 
representing higher levels of constraint).
29
 In 1900, Chile and Costa Rica both 
earned the highest marks in the region for executive constraint (each scoring 7 out 
of 7). Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, on the other hand, all scored 
1s. By 2000, there were more countries at the top of the scale. Bolivia, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay all received the highest score for 
executive constraint (7 of 7), while Ecuador and Venezuela had the lowest scores (4 
of 7). 
The common background of the region as well as the the institutional and 
geographic diversity makes Latin America a good region to test whether 
institutions and/or geography have an effect on country income.  
2.4 Data and Methodology 
In order to study the effect of institutions and geography on income in Latin 
America, we first need to define our measures of institutions and geography.  
2.4.1 Institutions 
We use two different measures of institutions in our analysis, both of which 
try to determine the extent that the chief executive is constrained in his or her 
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 Executive constraint is the xconst variable from the Polity IV dataset and is one of the 
institutional variables we use in our analysis (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009).  
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actions. The first variable, called EXCONST, is “the extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives” and ranges from 1 
to 7, with 7 being the most constrained (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009, p. 23).
30
 We 
normalize it to range between 0 and 1, with 1 representing the most constrained. In 
our sample, Costa Rica has the highest average level (averages a 1 out of 1), while 
Paraguay and Nicaragua have the lowest average levels (0. 20 and 0. 25, 
respectively). As these numbers suggest, there is wide variation in the sample. For 
example, in 1950 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua and Paraguay had the lowest value of 0.14 while Costa Rica and Brazil 
had the highest values at 1 and .71 respectively.  
Our second institutional variable, called POLCON, is similar to the 
EXCONST variable in that it tries to measure the extent to which policymakers are 
constrained in their actions. That is, do political actors have virtual discretion to 
enact policies unilaterally, or are they constrained by an institutional system of 
checks and balances? Henisz (2000) constructs the POLCON variable through a 
“simple spatial model of political interaction that incorporates information on the 
number of independent branches of government with veto power and the 
distribution of preferences across and within those branches.” This variable ranges 
from 0 to 1, with a 1 indicating the highest level of political constraint. In our 
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This variable, “xconst” in the dataset, measures the effective level of executive constraint, 
regardless of what the written laws dictate. Note that there are some coding interruptions in the 
measurement of EXCONST. Years of “foreign interruption” are coded as -66, years of anarchy is 
coded -77, and years of transition as -88 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009, p. 16).  It is difficult to recode 
these years without making some potentially controversial assumptions. Therefore, we drop them 
from the dataset.  
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sample, Costa Rica and Uruguay have the highest average level (0.36 and 0.33, 
respectively), while Mexico and Paraguay have the lowest average levels (0.09 and 
0. 10, respectively). There is also a lot of variation in any given year. For example, 
in 1950 the countries with the lowest level of political constrains were  Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (all which had a value of 0). During the same year, 
Brazil and Uruguay had the highest levels of political constraint (0.43 and 0.41, 
respectively). Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the institutional 
variables.  
It is important to note that EXCONST and POLCON are similar but do not 
measure exactly the same phenomenon. While both variables incorporate the 
existence of checks on the executive, POLCON takes into account the preferences 
of the individuals who make up the bodies, such as the legislative and the judicial 
branches, which are supposed to act as checks on the executive. This additional 
component tries to account for the existence of effective checks. For example, if the 
executive stacks the judiciary with friendly judges, then the judicial branch of that 
government is not an effective check on the chief executive.  
To illustrate some of the differences between these two measures, Figure 1 
plots both institutional measures through time for Chile (Panel A), Peru (Panel B), 
and Venezuela (Panel C). Looking at the evolution of these two variables for Chile, 
we can see that there is a decrease in both of them in 1973. This marks the coup 
d’état against Salvador Allende and the installation of the subsequent Augusto 
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Pinochet regime. After some time, both variables start to increase, but POLCON 
lags behind EXCONST and is also more variable, especially towards the end of the 
sample. The increase in the POLCON variable is timed with Pinochet’s exit from 
power in 1990 while the increase in the EXCONST variable is timed with the 
plebiscite on whether Pinochet should remain in power for eight more years in 
1988. So the timing is a bit different. The variability in the POLCON measure after 
1990 coincides with subsequent legislative and presidential elections, which would 
definitely have affected the distribution of preferences in the various branches of 
government.  
For Peru (seen in Panel B of Figure 1), both EXCONST and POLCON fall 
drastically in the early 1990s due to Fujimori’s autogolpe. However, the subsequent 
improvement in EXCONST is not as strongly matched by the POLCON variable. 
This is due to the fact that while both measures register the existence of checks on 
the executive, POLCON also takes into consideration the preferences of those 
individuals who make up the bodies that check the executive power. Legislative 
elections in 1992 and 1995 gave Fujimori’s party the majority of the seats which 
effectively gave him control of the legislative branch.
 31
 That is the why there is not 
a strong increase in either of the institutional variables. Both measures increase in 
2001 after Fujimori impeachment and subsequent presidential and legislative 
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 After Fujimori’s autogolpe, he called for elections in 1992 to fill an interim parliament to rewrite 
the constitution. Cambio 90 Nueva Mayoría, Fujimori’s party, won 44 of the 80 seats (Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 2012). In the 1995 elections, Fujimori and his party won the presidency and 




 POLCON does not increase as dramatically as EXCONST because the 
makeup of the legislative chamber favors the president’s party.
33
 
Venezuela’s institutional variables are depicted in Panel C of Figure 1. In 
general the EXCONST variable is more stable than the POLCON variable. 
However, they both register a decline towards the end of the sample that can be 
traced to the same source – Hugo Chavez. After taking office in 1999, Chavez 
increased the power of the president, which decreased the constraints on the 
executive. Additionally, by the end of the sample, his party was also in control of 
the legislature, which also contributes to the decrease in POLCON.  
2.4.2 Geography 
We use three different variables to capture the effect of geography on 
income.  The first measure is a dummy for landlocked countries. We include this 
measure to capture any negative effects on trade from not having easy coastal 
access.
34
 However, as can be seen from Figure 2, there are only two landlocked 
countries in our sample, Bolivia and Paraguay, so the results for this variable 
should not be given too much weight.  
                                                 
32
 Fujimori ran for a third term in 2000 with a new party – Perú 2000. This time around he won the 
presidency, but only 41.8% of the seats in the legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012). There 
were allegations of voter fraud and he was impeached late in 2000. New elections for both the 
presidency and the legislature were held in 2001 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012).  
33
 Alejandro Toledo won the presidency and his party, Perú Posible, won 26.3% of the seats in the 
legislature. While not a majority, still the single largest party in the chamber. In 2006, Alan Garcia 
was elected president and while his party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), did 
not win the majority of the seats, three other parties joined together and allied themselves with the 
President’s party (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2012).  
34
 Using mean distance from the nearest coastline instead of the landlocked dummy does not change 
our results. 
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The other geographic variables try to capture how tropical the country is. 
The literature on geography and development has found that temperate climates are 
more conducive to development. This is due in part to the types of agricultural 
crops that can be grown and to the fact that winter freeze helps to kill disease 
carrying insects (Sachs, 2001). The first of these measures is the absolute latitude 
of the approximate geographic center of each country (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2009). This is a simple variable that measures the distance of the country from the 
equator and is often used in the growth and geography literature (AJR 2001; Hall 
and Jones 1999; Rodrik, et al. 2004).
35
  Figure 2 shows the latitude for each 
country. The common practice is to express latitudes north of the equator as 
positive and those south of the equator as negative. As can be seen, the further 
away from the equator, the larger the latitude in absolute terms.  
The second variable is a tropical dummy equal to one if the country has 
more than 45% of its area in the tropics as defined by the Köppen-Geiger (KG) 
classification. 
36
 This determination is based on the type of vegetation and does not 
rely on the country’s latitude.  Figure 2 lists each country’s tropical percentage.  As 
can be seen, the countries with the largest tropical percentages tend to be closer to 
equator. However, since the KG classification relies on vegetation, it correctly 
accounts for non-tropical climate in countries close to the equator due to higher 
altitudes or deserts. For example, Ecuador, a country right on the equator, only has 
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 We follow the literature and standardize the absolute latitude to range between 0 and 1. This is 
done by dividing the absolute latitude by 90.  
36
 When using a higher percentage as the cutoff to build the tropical dummy, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is slightly smaller but still significant.  This is also true when using the actual percentage 
instead of a dummy. 
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51% of its land in the KG tropics. The rest of the land is at higher elevations and as 
a result has a more temperate climate. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic 
is further away from the equator but has 100% of its territory in the KG tropics. As 
these two examples show, absolute latitude is not a precise indicator of tropicality 
but it is strongly correlated.
37
 In our analysis, we will use either the absolute 
latitude or the tropical dummy but not both simultaneously.   
2.4.3 Methodology 
With the institutions and geography variables defined, we now turn to the 
methodology. We use five year averages of the data in order to mitigate any 
potential problems of autocorrelation. The basic model is: 
Yit = α0 + β1Institutionsit + δGeographyi + εit    
Where Yit is the log of the GDP per capita and comes from Angus Maddison’s 
historical statistics (Maddison, 2009). Institutionsit, are executive constraint 
(EXCONST), and political constraints (POLCON) and Geographyit is a vector of 
geography variables which always includes the dummy for landlocked countries as 
well as either the absolute latitude of each country or the dummy for tropicality.  
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 The correlation between our tropical dummy and absolute latitude is -0.89. 
(1) 
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2.4.3.1 Identification  
One of the statistical difficulties of studying the impact of institutions on 
income is the possibility that the two factors are simultaneously determined.
38
 That 
is, do good institutions promote economic growth or are richer countries just able 
to afford better institutions?  Of course, both claims could be true and there could 
be a feedback loop whereby richer countries adopt better institutions, which in turn 
increases their wealth, and so on. If we fail to control for this possibility 
econometrically, then the coefficient relating institutions to income will be biased. 
Therefore equation (1) needs to be estimated using an instrumental variable 
framework.  
There are a number of variables that are widely used as instruments for 
institutions. Mauro (1995) uses a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization to 
instrument for corruption, while Hall and Jones (1999) use distance from the 
equator and the fraction of the population speaking English and other European 
languages to instrument for their social infrastructure measure. Neither of these 
measures is appropriate for a panel of Latin American countries. The ethno-
linguistic fractionalization variable is measured in a single year and absolute 
latitude is time invariant, so using either as an instrument means that only cross-
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 Measuring institutions is problematic in other ways. First, there could be omitted variables that 
are correlated with institutions. For example, many cultural variables, such as a country’s work 
ethic, which is hard to measure, can be correlated with institutions. Second, there could be a 
problem with the measurement of the institutional variables themselves. All measures of 
institutional quality are indexes created by researchers, who construct the variables based on their 
own judgment as well as observed outcomes. As a result, these variables may be measured with 
error due to the bias of the researcher (Acemoglu, et al. 2001). To reduce these problems, we use 
several different measures of institutions and include country fixed effects to capture unobserved 
country specific effects in our robustness tests.  
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sectional estimations are possible. Both distance from the equator and percentage 
of the population speaking a European language are supposed to be proxies for 
Western influence.
39
 All of the countries in our sample are former colonies of 
Western European countries, which means that they all were influenced by Western 
Europe whether they are located near the equator or not. As for the fraction of 
people speaking a European language, Spanish or Portuguese is the official 
language in all Latin American countries in our sample, which means that the 
instrument would include most of the population.
40
 While in a larger sample of 
countries this variable may be an appropriate instrument, the small amount of 
variation in this variable for the Latin American region makes this a poor 
instrument for institutions in our sample.  
The most widely used of the instruments in the income and growth 
literature is Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s (hereafter, AJR) (2001; 2002) 
settler mortality variable. As discussed earlier, AJR (2001) argue that in places 
where European colonists faced low mortality rates, they settled and set up good 
institutions with checks and balances, while in places where Europeans suffered 
high mortality rates, they set up extractive institutions with few checks and 
balances. Therefore, high settler mortality at the time of colonization translated into 
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 The idea behind these measures is that countries that were strongly influenced by Western Europe 
were more likely to adopt favorable institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) argue that immigrants from 
Western Europe settled in areas of the world that were sparsely populated and had similar climates, 
such as the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand which have similar absolute latitudes to 
Western Europe. However, Sachs (2001) points out that there are many countries on the same 
latitude that have had wide-ranging levels of Western influence.). 
40
 An exception would be portions of the indigenous population that still actively speak their native 
languages. For example, in Bolivia, Aymara and Quechua, along with Spanish, are the official 
languages of the nation. However, Spanish is necessary to fully participate in the national economy. 
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poor institutions that persisted through time and affected current institutions. While 
the settler mortality instrument is one of the most popular in the literature, there has 
also been a fair amount of criticism of its construction.
41
  Even apart from any data 
construction problems, if we focus only on Latin American countries, AJR’s 
sample size is significantly reduced (from 64 to 18) and, in such a small sample, the 
settler mortality instrument is no longer significant.
42
 In order to determine how 
Latin American institutions affect income through time, we need an instrument that 
both moves over time and is not correlated with income levels.  
2.4.3.2 Constructing a New Instrument 
We believe that suffrage expansion is an appropriate instrument for 
institutions in Latin America. For starters, suffrage expansion has been a long and 
varied process in the region, which means that there should be sufficient variation 
in the variable both over time and across countries. Some countries, like Uruguay, 
granted universal suffrage early in the 20
th
 century, while others, such as Brazil, did 
not achieve universal suffrage until much later (Nohlen, 2005, p. 12).
43
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See Albouy (2008) and Olsson (2004). 
42
 We re-estimated AJR’s basic model in our sample of countries and failed to reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficient of settler mortality is zero in the first stage regression. Fielding and Torres 
(2008) propose an instrument based on factor endowments of colonial economies. However, like 
AJR’s instrument, their instrument only allows for a cross-sectional analysis. 
43
 Appendix 2 lists the various dates of suffrage expansion for each country.  
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In addition, historical data on suffrage should not have any direct effect on 
the country’s current level of per capita GDP.
44
 With each successive expansion, 
more citizens have the right to vote for their preferred institutions and policies, 
thereby directly affecting the institutions and indirectly affecting the level of per 
capita GDP.  
Finally, suffrage can have an important effect on institutions by allowing 
different segments of society to vote.  These groups may have very different 
institutional and policy preferences. For instance, Meltzer and Richards (1981) 
argue that any expansion of suffrage that moves the median voter (i.e. the decisive 
voter) to one whose income is below the average income will result in increased 
redistribution (and taxation since they model a balanced budget). Building on this 
idea, Abrams and Settle (1999) show that the extension of suffrage to women 
moves the median voter towards one that is “more likely to favor welfare 
spending.” Increased redistribution and welfare laws are two possible 
manifestations of institutional change that can occur as a result of extending the 
right to vote to other segments of society.  
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 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that countries that initially had favorable factor endowments 
were also slow to expand suffrage rights. If there is also a correlation between initial factor 
endowments and current GDP per capita, then the history of suffrage is not an appropriate 
instrument. However, when we examine the various suffrage expansion dates in the region, the 
richly endowed countries that Engerman and Sokoloff mention (Mexico, Peru, and Brazil) are not 
necessarily the last ones to expand suffrage and in some cases were some of the first to do so. In 
fact, in our sample, Mexico is the leader in the removal of economic and literacy requirements and 
the second to implement secret balloting. On the expansion of suffrage to women, however, they 
come in 13
th
 place. On the other hand, Brazil was 16
th 
in the region to remove economic 
requirements, last in removing literacy requirements, but 2
nd
 in granting suffrage to women. These 
two countries followed very different patterns in their suffrage expansions, casting doubt on the 
argument that initial factor endowments significantly influenced the expansion of suffrage.  
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To construct our instrument, we register the initial date of suffrage 
expansion as well the passage of time since the expansion took place. Based on 
historical voter turnout patterns, the new median voter that results from the 
expansion will have the strongest effect through the first couple of elections after 
the expansion, as newly enfranchised voters head to the polls in droves to express 
their preferences. However, after these “founding elections,” there tends to be a 
decline in voter turnout over time (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Kostadinova 
and Power (2008) study voter turnout in Latin America and find that it consistently 
falls in the four elections after the founding election.
45
 This suggests that as voter 
turnout declines, the median voter may be changing yet again. Based on this 
movement in the median voter, it is important to account not just for the initial date 
of suffrage expansion but also for the passage of time.  
The effect of suffrage expansion on voting participation was very strong in 
many Latin American countries. For example, within a few years of removing 
economic requirements, Chile’s proportion of registered voters more than tripled. 
In Argentina after the passage of the Sáenz Peña Law in 1912 (law requiring secret 
ballot and universal male suffrage), there was a three to fourfold increase in voter 
turnout for the parliamentary elections of 1912, 1913, and 1914 and an even higher 
increase in the presidential elections of 1916 (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005). The 
expansion of suffrage definitely increased the number of voters and seems to have 
also shifted the median voter. Elections before the passage of the Sáenz Peña Law 
were by the elites – primarily the landed oligarchs. The law expanded suffrage to 
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 Note that four elections is the maximum number they study.  
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all male citizens, which changed the median voter from being part of only the 
landed elite to now including the working class.  The law is credited with bringing 
about the defeat of the National Autonomist Party (PAN) that had long held power. 
The opposition candidate, Hipólito Yrigoyen, won the election in 1916, making 
him the first non-PAN president in more than three decades (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2005). This change in the control of both the executive and legislative 
branches of the Argentine government had the potential to influence policies and 
political institutions.   
Not only is there a wide variation in the expansion of suffrage across 
countries in Latin America, there are also different types of expansion, such as 
female enfranchisement, and the elimination of economic and literacy 
requirements. We construct several different measures of suffrage expansion to 
take these waves into account. In the construction of all of the instruments, we only 
consider effective suffrage by requiring that there be competitive elections as well 
as the use of secret ballots.
46
 The existence of regular elections and universal 
suffrage does not guarantee that a country has a consolidated democracy with free 
and competitive elections. Authoritarian regimes and one-party states commonly 
rig elections, a practice which prevents people’s true preferences from being 
translated into institutions. For that reason, we do not count such elections as valid 
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 We use the Polity IV variable XRCOMP to determine whether a country is has competitive 
elections. The variable measures the “competitiveness of executive recruitment” and a value of 2 or 
3 is considered competitive. In the Polity IV dataset, a value of 2 is given for transitional 
arrangements, or dual executives where one is chosen through competitive elections, and a value of 
3 is given when the chief executive of the country is chosen through competitive elections (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2009, p. 20). 
49 
in our instrument construction.
47
  Limiting the sample to periods with secret 
balloting ensures that citizens are able to vote their true preferences. Elections 
using secret ballots are likely to have a different effect on institutions than public 
voting, where voters may feel coerced to vote according to elite preferences 
(Baland and Robinson, 2006).  
After identifying the years that meet the criteria of competitive elections 
and the use of secret ballot, we construct the various suffrage instruments by 
adding the number of years that all requirements have been met and depreciating 
previous years by 5%. This reduces the importance of the earlier years, causing the 
marginal increase in the variable to be positive but decreasing over time.
48 
We 
depreciate past years in order to account for the fact that the experience with 
suffrage in the more distant past is not as important as suffrage experience more 
recently. In other words, the stock of suffrage experience should be depreciated to 
account for the reduction in importance of suffrage experience over time. As we 
discussed above, the importance of the initial suffrage experience on policy and 
institutions is likely to diminish over time.  Additionally, the depreciation also 
reduces the value of the instrument (once the instrument is non-zero) during years 
when there are no competitive elections. This depreciation could cause the suffrage 
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 Examples of dictatorships with elections that are not counted in our instrument are Trujillo in the 
Dominican Republic (1930-1961), Pinochet in Chile (1973-1989), and Somoza in Nicaragua (1936-
1956) while the longest-lived one party system that held periodic elections is Mexico under the PRI 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party).  
48
 Gerring, et al. (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2009) depreciate the number of years a country 
has been democratic and use depreciation rates between 1% and 6%. We chose 5% because it was 
within that range and seemed a reasonable estimate. Our results are robust to using a non-
depreciated instrument (i.e. a 0% depreciation rate). These results are available upon request. 
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instruments to fall to zero if competitive elections are not re-instated quickly 
enough.  
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics and basic descriptions of the 
instruments. The first, called Male, is the depreciated number of years a country has 
had competitive, secret, male suffrage without economic requirements (literacy 
requirements were still in place). The second, called Male_All, is the depreciated 
number of years the country has had competitive, secret, universal male suffrage 
(with no economic or literacy requirements). The third, called Female, is similar to 
the first variable but voting now includes females (although literacy requirements 
are still in place). The last is called Universal and is equal to the depreciated 
number of years with competitive, secret, universal suffrage.
49
   
Figure 3 plots the evolution of different types of suffrage for Argentina, 
Costa Rica, and Chile (more on each type of instrument below).  In each case we 
have depreciated the suffrage instruments. The Costa Rican case is perhaps the 
easiest to interpret.  In all four panels, the different suffrage instruments rise 
smoothly with the only difference being the starting date. This pattern is due to 
Costa Rica’s long democratic history. Once suffrage was expanded, there have 
been continuous competitive elections in which all groups get an opportunity to 
exercise that right.  
The Chilean example is not nearly as smooth.  The depreciated instruments 
increase until 1973, when there was a coup d’etat that brought Augusto Pinochet 
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 In constructing the voting variable, we start with the year of independence for each country in 
order to capture the full history of suffrage. However, the analysis is constrained by the data 
availability of other variables and that reduces the sample size considerably.  
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into power. After that point, there were no competitive elections until 1989, at 
which point the value of the instruments start to increase again. In both Panel B and 
Panel D, the initial increase does not begin until 1970, when Chile finally granted 
suffrage to the illiterate population. As a result, the Male_All and Universal plots 
(Panel B and Panel D) only start increasing in 1970 and then decline during 
Pinochet’s regime. In Argentina’s case, there are lots of dips that coincide with 
periods of non-competitive elections (coups and military regimes).The final dip 
coincides with the military take-over that ended Isabel Martínez de Perón’s short-
lived presidency and it recovers once competitive elections are re-instated in the 
early 1980s.   
From the list of possible instruments in Table 2.2, we chose the variable that 
is most highly correlated with our institutional measures.
50
 In this case, depreciated 
universal suffrage, which we call Universal, is the instrument most highly 
correlated with the executive constraint variable and the second most highly 
correlated with the political constraints variable.
51
 Using this instrument, we 
estimate in the next section the effects of institutions on county income in our panel 
setting.   
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 While the rest of the data is averaged over a five-year period, the instrument used in the value for 
the year before the average and these correlations are based on this timing. 
51
 For comparison’s sake, we use the same instrument for both of our institutional measures. 
Appendix 3 presents the correlation coefficients for each of the institutional variables and all of the 
possible instruments. 
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2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Main Results 
We estimate our model for each of the two institutional measures for 18 
Latin American countries from 1900 to 2007 using five-year averaged data (the 
instrument is the value for year before the 5 year average).  Tables 3 and 4 report 
the results using EXCONST and POLCON, respectively.  The standard errors 
reported in parenthesis are clustered robust standard errors. The last two rows in 
both tables report the p-values for the Hausman test and the F-test on the 
instrument. The F-test results show that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the suffrage instrument and the institutional variables while 
the Hausman test results indicate that the instrumental variable results presented in 
the tables are preferred over ordinary least squares.  
The first two columns in Table 2.3 present the results of using both 
institutions and geographic variables, while the third column shows the results 
using country fixed effects. We find that the EXCONST coefficients are always 
significant and of similar magnitude even when using country fixed effects. An 
increase from the average level of EXCONST to one standard deviation above the 
average level results in an increase in GDP per capita of around $2,150.  
Similarly, Table 2.4 shows the results using POLCON as the institutional 
measure. The first two columns include geographic variables and the last column 
includes country fixed effects. Here too the coefficients on the institutional measure 
are significant even when country fixed effects are included. While the coefficients 
53 
appear larger than the EXCONST coefficients, the one standard deviation changes 
are actually quite similar. An increase from the average level of POLCON to one 
standard deviation above the average results in an increase of about $2,550 in per 
capita GDP.  
Even if the effect is the lowest number from these estimates for both types 
of institutions, the change is still very large considering that these are per capita 
figures and the smallest country in our sample had a population of more than 3 
million in 2007. Our results indicate that Latin American countries have a lot to 
gain from improving their scores on institutional measures.
52
  
The geography variables in columns 1 and 2 of both Tables 3 and 4 have the 
expected signs.
53
 Depending on the specification, we find that being landlocked 
reduces per-capita GDP by $779 (Column 2 of Table 2.3) and $732 (Column 2 of 
Table 2.4). Absolute latitude is positive and significant, which indicates that 
countries that are further away from the equator have higher per-capita incomes on 
average. More specifically, if we move from the average absolute latitude to one 
standard deviation closer to the equator GDP per capita decreases between $419 
(Table 2.4) and $579 (Table 2.3). This result reinforces the finding that being 
tropical has a negative effect on GDP per capita. Based on the tropical dummy 
coefficients, the penalty for being tropical is much larger than the absolute latitude 
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  There are two obvious caveats to this interpretation. One is that we should remember that our 
variable measures de facto, and not de jure, executive constraints. It is not simply a matter of 
passing the right laws but rather their enforcement, an issue that has been perennially troublesome 
for Latin American countries. Second, it is possible that the executive constraint variable is a partial 
proxy for some unknown third variable. If so, then just merely copying the formal constraints of a 
richer country will not guarantee higher per-capita income. 
53
 Note that because the geography variables are time-invariant, they drop out of the estimation 
when country fixed effects are included. 
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results indicate. The GDP per capita penalty for being tropical ranges between 
$1784 (Table 2.4) and $1989 (Table 2.3).
54
   
The results indicate that both institutions and geography have significant 
effects on country income in Latin America. However, the magnitude of the 
geographic penalties is much smaller than the potential benefit from improving 
institutions.  
2.5.2 Jackknife Results 
There may be some concern that our results are being driven by one 
country. To test whether this is true, we perform a country-by-country jackknife 
exercise by re-estimating each specification in Tables 3 and 4 eighteen times, each 
time excluding one country. This reduces the sample between 9 and 21 
observations depending on how many years the country that is excluded enters the 
original dataset. Table 3.5 shows the coefficient distributions from this exercise. 
The means in all instances are very similar to the coefficient estimates reported in 
Tables 3 and 4. The signs are all consistent with the main results and the ranges for 
the institutional coefficients are within reasonable distance from our main 
estimates. The asterisks next the variables identify which results are statistically 
significant for all iterations. As is clear from the Table, all coefficients are 
significant except the landlocked variable. That is not surprising considering that 
there are only two landlocked variables in our sample. Based on these results we 
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 Using the actual percentage tropical instead of the dummy, yields smaller penalties but still larger 
than the absolute latitude results indicate. These results are available upon request. 
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conclude that our coefficient estimates for all but the landlocked variable are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of any particular country.  
Overall, the results suggest that institutions have a positive and significant 
effect on a country’s income per capita. While the geographic penalties are 
economically and statistically significant, they are smaller than the potential 
benefits from improving institutional quality. In any case, a country cannot easily 
change its geography but it can raise per-capita GDP by improving institutions. 
From this, we conclude that countries should take as given what they cannot 
change and focus on the factors that they can change.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Income differences across Latin American countries are quite large. In order 
to better understand what factors contribute to this disparity, we study the effect of 
institutions and geography on country income. Using a panel of 18 Latin American 
countries, we test the effects of institutions and geography on country income. To 
address the problem of endogeneity of institutions, we use a new instrument based 
on the history of suffrage expansion that allows us to use a panel framework. We 
find strong evidence that both institutions and geography are important 
determinants of country income. These results are robust to changes in the number 
of countries and the institutions results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed 
effects.  From the results, the geographic penalties are smaller in magnitude than 
the benefits from improving institutional quality. It is important to remember that 
geography is not entirely about the physical location of a country but also refers to 
56 
climate, the vegetation, and the disease environment. So while a country cannot 
easily change these, it can mitigate the effects of tropical diseases like malaria, 
yellow fever, and dengue fever through vaccinations and education. 
The biggest policy implication is that Latin American countries stand to 
benefit from improving executive and political constraints. Many countries in our 
sample have achieved a high level of both in the last decade and for those countries, 
it is important that they not slip backwards. Unfortunately, there are countries, such 
as Venezuela, that have moved in the wrong direction. Governments do have the 









Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Executive Constraint (EXCONST) 0.460 0.344 0 1 
Political Constraints (POLCON) 0.210 0.195 0 0.688 
Landlocked 0.090 0.287 0 1 
Absolute Latitude
*
 0.178 0.102 0.022 0.378 
Tropical 0.613 0.488 0 1 
Log of GDP per capita 7.984 0.596 6.743 9.286 
Note: the data is five year averaged; N=266 
*Absolute latitude is divided by 90 







Male Depreciated number of 
years with male suffrage 
without economic 
requirements, with secret 
ballot, and competitive 
elections (literacy 
requirements still in place) 
6.593 6.240 0 19.686 
Male_All  Depreciated number of 
years with universal male 
suffrage (no economic or 
literacy requirements), 
with secret ballot, and 
competitive elections  
5.354 6.088 0 19.686 
Female Depreciated number of 
years with male suffrage 
without economic or 
literacy requirements, 
female suffrage, with 
secret ballot, and 
competitive elections 
5.146 5.970 0 18.925 
Universal Depreciated number of 
years with universal 
suffrage, with secret 
ballot, and competitive 
elections 
4.195 5.675 0 18.925 

























Table 2.4: The Effect of Political Constraints on Income in 
Latin America between 1900 and 2007 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita 
POLCON 3.197*** 3.276*** 3.145*** 
 (0.488) (0.49) (0.352) 
Landlocked -0.211 -0.279***  
 (0.149) (0.094)  
Absolute Latitude 1.515*   
 (0.842)   
Tropical   -0.536***  
   (0.144)  
Constant 7.062*** 7.703*** 7.323*** 
 (0.192) (0.145) (0.081) 
Country Fixed Effects no no yes 
Hausman p-value 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Instrument F-Test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: N=266 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table 2.3: The Effect of EXCONST on Income in Latin 
America between 1900 and 2007 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP per capita 
EXCONST 1.562*** 1.580*** 1.649*** 
 (0.211) (0.214) (0.17) 
Landlocked -0.25 -0.299***  
 (0.15) (0.089)  
Absolute Latitude 2.163***   
 (0.675)   
Tropical  -0.584***  
   (0.147)  
Constant 6.904*** 7.701*** 7.225*** 
 (0.176) (0.139) (0.084) 
Country Fixed Effects no no yes 
Hausman p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Instrument F-Test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: N = 266 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 2.5: Jackknife Coefficient Distributions 
Table 2.3, Column (1) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
EXCONST* 1.562 0.056 1.392 1.648 
Landlocked -0.250 0.064 -0.433 -0.073 
Absolute Latitude* 2.154 0.198 1.563 2.587 
Constant* 6.904 0.045 6.848 6.998 
Table 2.3, Column (2) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
EXCONST* 1.580 0.056 1.413 1.656 
Landlocked -0.299 0.028 -0.355 -0.244 
Tropical* -0.585 0.042 -0.669 -0.482 
Constant* 7.702 0.041 7.614 7.816 
Table 2.3, Column (3) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
EXCONST* 1.650 0.079 1.394 1.759 
Constant* 7.224 0.045 7.177 7.385 
Table 2.4, Column (1) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
POLCON* 3.197 0.126 2.911 3.426 
Landlocked -0.211 0.059 -0.365 -0.052 
Absolute Latitude* 1.508 0.244 0.919 2.058 
Constant* 7.062 0.050 6.960 7.146 
Table 2.4, Column (2) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
POLCON* 3.275 0.123 2.985 3.490 
Landlocked -0.278 0.032 -0.339 -0.197 
Tropical* -0.537 0.040 -0.642 -0.464 
Constant* 7.704 0.039 7.635 7.810 
Table 2.4, Column (3) 
  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
POLCON* 3.146 0.161 2.665 3.405 
Constant* 7.322 0.039 7.277 7.442 
































































































































































































































































































































Panel C: Venezuela 
POLCON EXCONST 
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Figure 2.2: Map of Latin America with Geographic Variables 
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Panel B:  
Depreciated Male_All 








































































































































































































































Panel D:  
Depreciated Universal 
Argentina Chile Costa Rica 
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Chapter 3: Bittersweet Relationship: 
Political Instability and International Commodity Prices  
in Latin America 
 
“As long as oil prices remain high, Chavez seems likely to continue in 
power. But when they fall, Venezuela faces a reckoning.” 
Michael Reid 
Forgotten Continent (2007) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Atacama Desert, in what is now Northern Chile, is one of the driest 
areas in the world. Under normal circumstances, such a desolate piece of land 
would not be a source of international dispute. However, the discovery of sodium 
nitrates in the 1860s made this region as valuable to the international community 
then as oil fields are to us today. Between 1879 and 1883, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru 
fought in the War of the Pacific for control of this desert. As a consequence of the 
war, Chile won the disputed territory and with it a monopoly on the supply of 
nitrates (Sater, 1986). At the time, demand for nitrates was high and so was the 
price that buyers were willing to pay for it.  The conflict decided which country 
would control the area that produced large rents for the mining companies and/or 
governments.
55
 In other words, high world prices of nitrates were a factor in the 
war. As this episode illustrates, world prices of export commodities can have an 
influential effect on a country’s or a region’s political stability, especially in 
countries that depend heavily on commodity exports as a source of revenue. 
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 When the war broke out, Bolivia had nationalized the mining companies in its territory and 
therefore rents accrued to the government.  
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Nitrate is just one in a long list of commodities that Latin American 
countries have exported. All of the nations in the region have relied on a multitude 
of commodity exports since their independence. Today, many Latin American 
countries still export large amounts of primary commodities and are therefore 
vulnerable to movements of international commodity prices. If anything, this 
dependence has grown. Recent work has found that for many countries in the 
region, commodity export revenues have been growing in importance since the 
1990s (Sinnott, 2009). Since the War of the Pacific, no international war has 
broken out in the region over control of a commodity. However, many countries 
have experienced internal political instability. Given the historical and current 
importance of commodities for Latin American countries, it is worth examining to 
what extent the political stability of the region is affected by the fluctuations in 
commodity prices. 
Using various commodity price indexes, I test whether commodity prices 
have an effect on the political stability of 18 Latin American countries between 
1919 and 2000. Based on the result from a probit model, I find that changes in a 
country’s total commodity price index have a significant effect on political 
instability. The results when disaggregating each country’s commodity price index 
into point source commodities (i.e. capital intensive, appropriable, or easily taxed 
commodities such as natural resources and plantation crops) and diffuse 
commodities (i.e. small holder owned, difficult to tax commodities such as small 
farm production and livestock) are similar and robust to the use of a count model 
66 
(i.e. zero-inflated negative binomial model).
56
 Further disaggregation of the point 
source commodities into its mineral and agricultural components reveal that the 
point source effect is driven primarily by increases in mineral prices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 the reviews related 
literature. Section 3 discusses why a Latin American regional focus is appropriate. 
Section 4 describes the measurement of political instability, commodities, the 
construction of commodity price indexes, and the control variables. Section 5 
presents the estimation framework and the main results. Alternative indexes and an 
alternative estimation strategy are discussed and their results are presented in 
Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
There has been a great deal of work done on the relationship between 
natural resources and the onset/duration of civil wars.
57
 Ross (2004) summarizes 
the literature into four general findings. The first is that oil exports increase the 
likelihood of conflict, especially separatist conflict since secession can be 
economically advantageous to those in an oil producing region of a country.
58
 The 
second is that “lootable” resources prolong the duration of conflict but are not the 
cause of conflict. The availability of easily extracted resources allows for factions 
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Point source refers to natural resources “extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base, 
such as oil and minerals” as well as plantation crops and diffuse refers to natural resources “relying 
primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms” (Isham, Woolcok, 
Pritchett, and Busby, 2005).   
Appendix 1 lists the countries and years in my sample 
57
 See for example  Besley and Persson (2008),  Buhaug and Gates (2002),  Collier and  Hoeffler 
(2002; 2004; 2006) Fearon (2004), and Lujala et al. (2005). 
58
 See for example Collier and Hoeffler (2004; 2006) 
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to easily acquire and sell these resources to fund their campaign.
59
 The third finding 
is that agricultural commodities are uncorrelated with civil wars and the fourth is 
that primary commodities are “not robustly associated” with civil wars.
60
 In 
contrast to this last point, more recent work has found a significant relationship 
between primary commodity prices and the onset of civil war. In a sample of 124 
countries, Besley and Persson (2008) find that higher world prices of both imports 
and exports increase the likelihood of civil wars. Brückner and Ciccone (2010) 
focus on 39 Sub-Saharan African countries and find that civil wars are more likely 
to begin following downturns in the world prices of a country’s main commodity 
exports. 
Another form of instability affected by commodities is regime change or 
changes between autocracy and democracy. While regime type is not a measure of 
instability (as is civil war), the democracy literature studies the effect of 
commodities, more specifically, natural resource endowments on democracy. 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) find that natural resource booms had more of an effect 
in keeping countries democratic, or moving them towards democracy than keeping 
them autocratic or moving them towards autocracy. In contrast, Ross (2001; 2009) 
finds that oil and mineral wealth have strong anti-democratic effects, that oil wealth 
prolongs authoritarian rule, and that the effect of prolonging authoritarian rule has 
become stronger over time. However, he goes on to show that oil-rich countries in 
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 A lootable resource refers to commodities like gemstones and drugs which are easily extracted by 
unsophisticated means.  
60
 See Fearon (2004) for the third point. 
Primary commodities are a more general category which includes agricultural goods, oil, and other 
non-fuel minerals. See Fearon and Latitin (2003) for the fourth point. 
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Latin America do not follow this trend (Ross, 2010). Instead, he finds that oil 
production is linked to increased governmental conflict (i.e. conflict over control of 
the existing state), which is a different type of instability. Similarly, Haber and 
Menaldo (2010) find that natural resources do not have a significant effect on 
democracies or autocracies in Latin America – making natural resources in the 
region neither a curse nor a blessing.  
3.3  Latin American Focus  
The majority of the literature on civil wars and commodities are either not 
region specific (e.g. Besley and Persson, 2008) or focus on Africa (e.g. Brückner 
and Ciccone, 2010). In the first case, the majority of the countries with civil wars 
are in Africa and the Middle East and only a few incidences of civil war are from 
Latin America.
61
 The fact that there are just a few civil war observations in the 
region implies that the majority of the political instability takes a different form. If 
we focus on other forms of instability, Latin America is the most politically 





specifically, for 18 Latin American countries between 1919 and 2000 there were 
more than 690 anti-government demonstrations, more than 570 political 
assassinations, more than 380 crises that threatened to bring down the current 
regime, and more than 700 riots. The most politically unstable country, Argentina, 
had 77 anti-government demonstrations, 67 political assassinations, 54 government 
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 Depending on your definition of civil war, there may not be any civil war observations in the 
region during the twentieth century. 
62
 Instability events are political assassinations, anti-government demonstrations, government crises, 
and riots.  
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crises, and 85 riots. Even the most politically stable country, Costa Rica, had 11 
anti-government demonstrations, 6 political assassinations, 3 government crises, 
and 10 riots.
63
 Focusing on civil wars hides the regions true level of instability. 
 
 
Second, while some work has been done on the relationship between 
commodity prices and civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa and both Sub-Saharan 
African and Latin America are primary commodity exporters, their historical 
backgrounds and cultures are quite different, making it difficult to generalize 
Africa’s results to Latin America.
64
 In addition, since most Latin American 
countries gained their independence before the turn of the twentieth century, there 
is a large amount of information on sovereign countries in the region, allowing for 
a longer time period of analysis. This is in contrast to many parts of Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, which did not attain independence until later in the twentieth 
century.  
In addition to focusing on civil wars and other regions of the world, the 
natural resource and instability literature focuses primarily on oil producing states 
and other lootable resources. While Latin America does have oil-producing states, 
the majority of the region does not export oil, and even though there is an 
abundance of commodity exports, very few are lootable. By focusing on Latin 
America, I can use the region’s wide variety of primary commodity exports which 
has a lot of cross-country variation. On the agricultural side, the range of products 
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 All instability numbers come for the Cross-National Time Series Data archive (Banks, 2011). 
64
 See for example Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Brückner and Ciccone (2010). Work on specific 
commodities, such as diamonds, includes mostly African countries and a few other countries in the 
world. See for example Lujala  et al. (2005). 
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is diverse, ranging from tropical fruits like bananas to temperate grains like wheat. 
On the non-agricultural side there are minerals ranging from iron ore to petroleum. 
This variability in commodity exports facilitates the study of the link between 
certain types of commodity exports and political stability and whether that 
influence is beneficial or detrimental to the countries in the region.  
To study how political instability in Latin America is affected by 
commodity prices, I consider additional forms of instability beyond civil war as 
well as a broader set of commodities besides oil.  
3.4  Data 
Before analyzing the effects of commodity prices on instability in Latin 
America, it is necessary to define instability, identify the export commodities for 
each Latin American country for the period of study, and create the appropriate 
commodity price indexes. In this section, I discuss how these three topics are 
addressed in the literature and how they are defined or constructed for the purposes 
of this study. 
3.4.1 Defining Instability 
The literature on political instability has not come to an agreement on how 
to measure political instability. However, there are two general approaches. The 
first is to use principle component analysis to create a single measure of political 
instability. The measure of instability is based on the principle component of a list 
of variables that are considered to be indicators of political instability – such as 
71 
anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, and riots.
65
 The second approach 
is to use individual instability variables directly in the analysis or by including a 
dummy variable for the country year in which the event(s) occurred.
66
 
The channels through which commodity prices can affect instability may 
have different effects on different indicators of instability. For example, an increase 
in commodity prices may increase the probability of anti-government 
demonstrations but decrease that of government crises. A principle component 
instability measure may not be able to capture these event specific effects.
67
 In 
order to try and capture these effects, I follow the second strategy by indicating the 
occurrence of political instability with a dummy variable. This allows me to create 
dummy variables for each instability indicator. Since there is no one variable in the 
literature that adequately captures the idea of political instability, I use four 
different variables – anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, government 
crises, and riots – all of which are different manifestations of political instability. 
These measures come from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive and their 
definitions are listed in Table 3.1 (Banks, 2011). This dataset provides consistent 
definitions across time and countries with data back to 1919.
68
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 See for example Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), Annett (2001), Fosu (2001), Campos 
and Nugent (2002), Schatzman (2005), and Blanco and Grier (2009). 
66
 See for example Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina et al. (1996), and Blomberg (1996), Camignani 
(2003) 
67
Also, as I am constructing at least one independent variable (section 3.3), it seems inappropriate to 
also have a constructed dependent variable.  
68
 Data from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive has been widely used in both economics 
and political science fields. See for example Barro (1991), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), 
Easterly and Levine (1997)  and  Levine and Zervos (1998). 
72 
3.4.2 Latin American Commodities 
There are twenty five primary export commodities that make up the 
majority of the commodity export share for Latin American countries during the 
20
th
 century. Table 3.2 lists these commodities.  
It is important to note that some of these commodities, such as rubber and 
nitrates, were dominant exports in the beginning of the century while others, such 
as soybeans and iron ore, are dominant in the latter part of the century. Because this 
is a study of how primary commodity export prices affect political stability 
throughout the century, all dominant commodities in the century must be included 
even if they are only relevant for part of the century. The commodity export data is 
used to build each country’s commodity price indexes.  
3.4.3 International Commodity Prices and Price Indexes 
International primary commodity price data is available from various 
sources for the entirety of the twentieth century. Appendix 2 lists the data sources 
for the primary commodity prices used in the analysis.
69
 Even though there is data 
for all commodities under study, including all twenty five commodity prices would 
create problems in the specification due to their high level of collinearity.
70
 Instead, 
price indexes based on the Latin American commodities and their international 
prices must be constructed.  
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 Most of the price data comes from the Grilli and Yang commodity data series (Grilli and Yang, 
1988). They, and the update of their data by Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007), index all prices to the 1977-
1979 average for each series. For consistency and comparability, all price series that are not from 
the Grilli and Yang series are also index to the 1977-1979 average. 
70
 When including all twenty five commodity prices as well as the other control variables, the 
condition index is many orders of magnitudes larger than the conditional index when using the price 
indexes.  For a discussion of condition indexes see Belsley et al. (1980). 
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Most price indexes are created by weighting each commodity price in the 
index by its world export value share for a given base year.  Price indexes that 
focus on a certain region or subset of the world weight the prices by the value share 
of the region’s export of each commodity in the index for a given base year. For 
example, Grilli and Yang create a commodity price index based on the developing 
countries’ value share of exports and use 1977-79 average as their base year (Grilli 
and Yang, 1988).  
In order to construct a price index in this manner, value shares of the twenty 
five exports for the eighteen countries that make up the sample would be necessary. 
Unfortunately, this data is not available. Moreover there is no one year between 
1919 and 2000 where all twenty five commodities under consideration are 
exported. This makes choosing a base year that gives a good set of representative 
weights difficult. Therefore, a different weighting scheme needs to be used in order 
to construct the price indexes.  
In Latin America there are some commodities that are dominant for longer 
periods of time, such as sugar for Brazil and beef for Argentina whereas others, 
such as nitrates for Chile, are exported for a relatively short period of time in the 
20
th
 century. It stands to reason that when creating a price index for each country, 
the weights can be calculated by accounting for the number of years that the 
commodity is produced and exported in that particular country for the time period 
of the analysis. Given this, sugar in Brazil should get a higher weight than iron ore, 
which became a dominant export later on in the twentieth century. I create a 
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(1) 
weighting scheme for the price indexes based on the idea of country importance 
measured by the fraction of all years that each commodity is produced within each 
country (i.e. commodities produced in more years get a higher weight). The 
commodity weights, ωic, are therefore calculated as: 
     
      
        
 
where ditc is a dummy equal to one if commodity c is produced in country i during 
year t and zero otherwise. This weight is unique to each commodity and the sum of 
all the ωc for each country is equal to one.  
Using this weighting scheme, each price index is calculated in the following 
way: 
                                
 
    
where ωic is the weight given to each commodity in country i that makes up the 
price index and Pct  is the international commodity price for commodity c at time t. 
The price indexes created for each country are based on the country’s commodities 
exports. Table 3.3a reports the summary statistics for the various commodity price 
indexes constructed. The first, Total Price Index (Total PI), is constructed using all 
of each country’s export commodities. This is the most aggregate index in this 
study. To see the effect of changes in prices of specific subgroups of commodities, 
I also create the Diffuse Price Index (Diffuse PI) and Point Source Price Index (Pt. 
Source PI).  Table 3.2 lists the commodities in each group. Lastly, I further 
(2) 
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disaggregate the Point Source Price Index into its mineral and agricultural 
components to create the Point Source-Mineral Price Index (Mineral PI) and the 
Point Source-Agriculture Price Index (Agricultural PI).  
3.4.4 Additional Covariates 
 I include five control variables in the estimation: regime type, growth of 
real GDP per capita, inflation, population, and a neighborhood effect.
71
 All control 
variables, as well as the commodity indexes, are lagged one year to mitigate any 
concerns about reverse causality.
72
  Table 3.3b lists the summary statistics for all 
variables.  
The first control variable, regime type, is a dummy for democracy. 
Following Besley and Persson (2008), it is equal to one when the polity2 score for 
country i at time t is greater than zero and zero otherwise.
 73
  Based on this 
definition, less than half of the country years in the sample qualify as democratic. 
Various works have studied the effect of regime type on political instability. Some 
of the findings suggest that democracies experience less instability (Ellingsen 2000; 
Parsa 2003; Besley and Persson 2008), less violence (Rummel 1995), and less civil 
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 While the results presented here are with all the right-hand side variables lagged one period, the 
results are still significant when they are lagged two and three periods. These results are available 
upon request. 
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 Endogeneity of commodity prices could be a problem in the analysis if these countries are price 
setters. In such a case, instability in the country could lead to higher world prices of the 
commodities produced in the country as the world market adjusts to the decline in supply. However, 
I am studying commodities that are produced not only in Latin America, but also in other regions of 
the world. As such, most of these countries are price takers (there may be an exception in the case of 
Chile with nitrates and copper prices). I use one year lags of all dependent variables to avoid any 
potential problems of endogeneity. It is harder to argue that the political instability in a country this 
year has an effect on commodity prices, population, and GDP last year.  
73
The polity2 variable ranges from -10 to 10 and is the difference between the democracy and 
autocracy variables in the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). Higher values of the 
polity2 variable means more democratic. 
The results are robust to a more stringent (higher polity 2) definition of democracy.  
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wars (Besley and Persson, 2008). In Latin America, Schatzman (2005) finds that 
between 1980 and 1993, more democratic regimes appear to experience more 
rebellions (violent) but less collective protests (non-violent). Based on Schatzman’s 
work, one would expect that, depending on the instability measure, the effect of 
democracy may be positive or negative.  
 The second control variable is growth of real GDP per capita. The literature 
on instability has shown that economic performance has a major influence on 
political instability. There are two channels through which this effect works. The 
first is that the opportunity cost of rising up or rebelling is lower when incomes are 
low or falling (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Dube and Vargas, 2010). The second is 
that deprivation tends to increase when there are hard economic times; this, in turn, 
fuels the image of government incompetence (Gurr, 1970; Posner, 1997; Nafziger 
and Auvinen, 2002). Supporting this idea, Alesina et al. (1996) find that lower GDP 
growth is associated with a higher probability of unconstitutional political change 
and Besley and Persson (2008) find that poorer countries are more likely to be 
involved in conflict than richer ones. Both of these channels suggest that negative 
growth increases the likelihood of instability. 
 I also control for inflation. Since I am testing for the effect that commodity 
prices have on political stability through an increase (or reduction) in income that 
comes from changes in international prices (i.e. the production side), I need to 
control for domestic prices (i.e. the consumption side). It is very likely that 
increases in domestic prices of agricultural and energy products (the majority of the 
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commodities in the study) results in instability as citizens become unhappy with the 
increasing prices. Cukierman et al. (1992) find that seignorage and political 
instability are positively correlated. Paldam (1987) finds evidence that in Latin 
America, military regimes, which he considers to be relatively more unstable than 
democratic regimes, are correlated with higher levels of inflation. Moreover, few 
Latin American regimes have survived an episode of hyperinflation and regime 
change can be a form of instability. In order to disentangle the two effects – the 
consumption vs. the production effects – the rate of inflation is included to capture 
the consumption side.  
Population size is included in the analysis to control for any potential effect 
that population size may have on instability.
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  Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that 
the risk of conflict is proportional to population size.  They suggest that with larger 
populations, both grievances (ethnic or religious hatred, political repression and/or 
exclusion and economic inequality) and opportunity to rebel increase.  
The last control variable is a neighborhood dummy. This variable takes a 
value of one if there is at least one instability event in a contiguous country and 
zero otherwise.  This dummy is constructed to match the particular instability event 
under consideration and information for contiguous countries that are not part of 
the sample were used to construct this variable (e.g. Haiti). Table 3.3b also reports 
the summary statistics for all the neighborhood dummies. Between 45 and 61 
percent of the country years contain unstable neighbors. Note that only one 
neighborhood dummy is used in each regression presented below.  
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 Using population growth does not significantly change the results presented below.  
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3.5 Model and Results 
3.5.1 Model 
The instability measures are all dichotomous, which means that a simple 
OLS framework is inappropriate because the predicated values may lie outside the 
zero-one range.
75
 Instead I use a probit model with the following form:  
Instabilityi,t = β1TotalPIi,t-1 + α’Controlsi,t-1 + ui + εit 
Where Instabilityi,t is a dummy variable equal to one when there is an instability 
event in country i at time t and zero otherwise.
76
 The first right hand side variable is 
the aggregate commodity price index, Total Price Index (Total PI), that is unique to 
each country and year.  Controlsi,t-1 is a vector containing the control variables 
previously discussed and ui are country specific effects.  
3.5.2 Results 
Table 3.4 shows the marginal effects for the probit results. Each column has 
a different type of political instability as the dependent variable and the 
neighborhood dummy captures the same type of instability as the dependent 
variable. The results show that changes in Total PI have a positive effect on anti-
government demonstrations and a negative effect on government crises and riots. 
More specifically, holding everything else constant, a one standard deviation 
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 The results using OLS are very similar to the marginal effects reported in Table 3.4. The OLS 
results are available upon request. 
I tested for autocorrelation using the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel-data models. In 
all cases in this study, the test fails to reject the null of no serial correlation. 
76
 I ran a Wooldridge test for serial correlation and the results using both the dummy instability 




increase in the Total PI increases the probability of anti-government 
demonstrations by 7.1% and decreases the probability of government crises by 
4.5% and riots by 5.9%. These results show the general effect that a country’s 
commodity prices have on these measures of political instability. However, keep in 
mind that there are a wide range of commodities in the Total PI and prices for 
different commodities do not always move in tandem. So while we can say that 
commodity prices have an effect on political instability, we cannot say whether a 
specific subgroup is driving these results. This point is addressed in the next 
section. 
As for the control variables, there appears to be a strong spillover effect. All 
of the neighborhood coefficients are positive, suggesting that the probability of 
political instability in a particular country increases when a neighbor experienced 
the same type of political instability. The democracy variable is also positive across 
the board meaning that these four types of political instability are more likely under 
democracies. It is not unusual to think about certain types of political instability 
being more likely under democracies and others under autocracies. Lastly, GDP 
growth is negative suggesting that increases in GDP growth decrease the 
probability of instability. This last result is in line with the findings in the literature. 
The results so far show that commodity prices affect political instability. 
But as the commodity price index used contains many different types of 
commodities, it is difficult to discern whether specific types of commodities are 
more likely to affect political instability than others.   
80 
3.6 Alternative Indexes and Estimation Framework 
 3.6.1 Point Source and Diffuse Indexes 
Broadly speaking, in the literature there are three general theories about 
how commodity prices affect political stability – the state as a prize theory, the 
state capacity theory, and the opportunity cost theory (Bazzi and Blattman, 2011).  
The first two theories, the state as a prize and the state capacity, rest on the 
idea of a rentier state. A rentier state is one that regularly receives external 
economic rents (Yates, 1996).
77
 A good example is an oil producing state which 
exports the majority (if not all) of its oil. These states regularly receive large 
amounts of money from external actors.  However, as Ross (2001) points out, other 
minerals also create rents which are captured directly by the state (through export 
taxes, corporate taxes, and state-owned enterprises). Isham et al. (2005) also make 
the argument that states are able to easily extract rents not just from all forms of 
natural resources (i.e. oil and minerals) but also from other resources that have a 
narrow geographic base such as plantation crops (e.g. through marketing boards 
and direct procurement by government). They call resources that provide rents for 
the government “point source resources” and resources whose rents are more 
difficult to capture, such as small farm production and livestock, “diffuse 
resources” (Isham et al. 2005).  
Rentier states collect higher revenues when the prices of point source 
commodities increase. This has two different effects on political instability. The 
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Hazem Beblawi (1987) refined this definition to one where a state receives rents from foreign 
actors and where only a few domestic actors are involved in the generation of this rent and “the 
majority being only involved in the distribution or utilization of it”   
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first is based on the idea that being in power means having control over these large 
rents. The state becomes a prize to have – state as a prize. This may cause 
instability as people try to gain control of the state. In other words, higher prices for 
point source commodities (i.e. higher potential rents for the government) increase 
the probability of political instability through this channel. On the hand, the 
increased revenue means the state has more resources to buy out the opposition, 
decrease taxes, increase spending, and/or increase the strength of the military to 
quell any unrest.
78
 That is, the state has more capacity to deal with instability – 
state capacity (Bazzi and Blattman, 2011). These two mechanisms, while working 
in opposite directions, are both influenced by the price of point source 
commodities.   
The opportunity cost theory works through the citizens instead of through 
the government by increasing or decreasing the opportunity cost of abandoning the 
productive sectors to enter into the destabilizing activity (be it demonstrating, 
rioting, etc.).  More specifically, a rise in commodity prices may reduce instability 
or conflict by increasing wages and income, which increases the opportunity cost of 
abandoning the productive sector in favor of other non-productive and/or 
destabilizing activities (Dube and Vargas 2010; Becker 1968; Grossman, 1991). 
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 To appease the masses, governments could increase spending on social programs and/or decrease 
taxes.  
For example, the government of Kuwait, with its vast amount of oil revenue is able to function 
without imposing any income or value added tax on its citizens. In Venezuela, President Hugo 
Chavez’s policies aimed at the poor, such as the Bolivarian Missions, are an example of social 
spending that targets the masses. The Bolivarian Missions or Misiones Bolivarianas are a list of 
social programs implemented by the Venezuela government under President Hugo Chavez. They 
include educational, nutritional and health, electoral, scientific, environmental, and anti-poverty 
programs (Embajada de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2011). 
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Because the opportunity cost theory works from the individuals perspective and not 
the state’s, this theory is most likely to work through commodity prices for diffuse 
resources as these are the types of commodities that are dominated by household 
production.  
To investigate what effect point source and diffuse commodity prices have 
on political instability, I estimate equation (3) using Pt. Source PI and Diffuse PI 
instead of Total PI. The results for the index coefficients are listed in Table 3.5a. 
Just as before, the dependent variable in each column is a different type of political 
instability.  
The first interesting point is that Pt. Source PI for assassinations is now 
significant, even if only at the 10% level, whereas in the previous estimation, the 
coefficient for Total PI in the assassination equation was not significant. Now that 
the commodities are disaggregated, we can see the coefficient on Pt. Source PI is 
positive while the coefficient on Diffuse PI is negative which might be the reason 
why the Total PI coefficient was not significant in the previous section.  More 
generally, the results show that an increase in the Pt. Source PI increases the 
probability of anti-government demonstrations and assassinations and decrease the 
probability of government crises and riots. Holding everything else constant, a one 
standard deviation increase in the Pt. Source PI increases the probability of anti-
government demonstrations by 6.6% and assassinations by 3.1% and decreases the 
probability of government crises and riots by 3.5% and 5.4%, respectively.  An 
increase in the Diffuse PI increases the probability of anti-government 
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demonstrations but decreases the probability of government crises and riots. A one 
standard deviation increase in the Diffuse PI increases the probability of ant-
government demonstrations by 6.3% and decreases the probability of government 
crises and riots by 5.5% and 4.9%, respectively.
79
   
While the simple model being use here cannot say anything about which 
theory is driving the results (i.e. state as a prize, state capacity and opportunity 
cost), we can try to interpret the results based on the signs of the coefficients of the 
two price indexes. A positive sign on the Pt. Source PI would fit with the state as a 
price theory while a negative sign would fit with the state capacity theory. The 
opportunity cost theory would fit only when there is a negative sign on the Diffuse 
PI. Based on the results for the Pt. Source PI, the state as a prize theory could 
explain the coefficients on anti-government demonstrations and assassinations. 
That is, when the international prices of point source resources increase, there is an 
increased incentive to be in power in order to control the increased revenues 
coming into the government from the commodities. The state capacity effect could 
explain the sign on government crises and riots. When prices of point source 
commodities increase, governments receive larger rents from these resources and 
are able to reduce taxes, increase spending, and/or increase military capacity. All of 
these tend to decrease instability. The negative sign on the diffuse PI for 
government crises and riots fit with the opportunity cost theory. That is, increases 
in the international price of diffuse commodities increase the opportunity cost of 
abandoning production of these commodities. Higher prices for the legal 
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 The lower bound is the assassination estimate and the upper bound is the estimate for purges. 
84 
commodities are an incentive to work in the productive sector instead of engaging 
in illegal, non-productive, or disruptive activities. However, the positive sign on the 
diffuse PI for anti-government demonstrations does not fit with any of the theories.  
3.6.2 Mineral vs. Agricultural Point Source Commodities 
The commodities that make up the Pt. Source PI include agricultural as well 
as mineral commodities. However, the existing literature consistently finds that 
changes in mineral prices (e.g. petroleum) are highly correlated with instability 
(Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004, 2006; Fearon 2004; 
Lujala et al. 2005) and only a few studies have found a correlation between 
instability and agricultural prices (Besley and Person, 2008; Brückner and  
Ciccone, 2010). In order to see if the Point Source results are driven by the 
minerals or the agricultural commodities in the index, I split the point source 
commodities into minerals and agricultural commodities. Table 3.2 lists which of 
the point source commodities are minerals and which are agricultural. I estimate 
equation (3) with Mineral PI, Agricultural PI and Diffuse PI instead of the Total PI. 
The index coefficient results are listed in Table 3.5b. From the results, it appears 
that the mineral prices are the driving force behind the point source results with the 
exception of anti-government demonstrations which is driven by the agricultural 
commodities.  
3.6.3 Count Model 
 So far, the various instability measures are dummy variables that take a 
value of one when there is at least one instability event in a given country year and 
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zero otherwise. However, the Banks data gives the total number of each type of 
event for each country year (Banks, 2011). There are estimation techniques that 
allow for the use of count data as a dependent variable.
80
 The appropriate model for 
the instability data is a Zero-Inflation Negative Binomial. A discussion of the 
various count data models as well as evidence supporting the choice of this model 
over others is presented in Appendix 3. This model has two components – a binary 
component and a count component. The binary section uses a logistic distribution 
and within this framework, “success” is a prediction of being a zero count and 
“failure” a non-zero count. The count/Negative Binomial part models the non-
negative integer outcomes which includes zeros.
81
 
Table 3.6 shows the zero-inflated negative binomial results using the Pt. 
Source PI and Diffuse PI. Panel A shows the marginal effects for the negative 
binomial component (the count part of the model) and Panel B shows the results for 
the logit component (the binary part of the model).  The negative binomial results 
using the count data model are similar to the probit results. From Panel A we can 
see that an increase in the Pt. Source PI increases the probability of anti-
government demonstrations and assassinations and decreases the probability of 
government crises and riots while an increase in the Diffuse PI increase the 
probability of anti-government demonstrations and assassinations.  
Focusing on the results presented in Panel B, recall that success in the 
binary part of the model is having a zero count of instability (i.e. no anti-
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 Appendix 4 lists the summary statistics for the instability measures in count data form.  
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 A truncated distribution would need to be used if the zeros were not included.  
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government demonstrations, no assassinations, etc.). The results show that an 
increase in the Pt. Source PI decreases the probability of having no anti-
government demonstrations (i.e. increases the probability of having a positive 
number of anti-government demonstrations) and increases the probability of having 
no assassinations (i.e. reduces the probability of having a positive number of 
assassinations). An increase in the Diffuse PI increases the probability of having no 
assassinations, no government crises, and no riots. In other words, it decreases the 
probability of having a positive number of these three events. 
Overall, the results from the count model are similar to the results in Table 
3.5a. The similarity in the results suggests that the effects of commodity prices are 
relatively robust regardless of the estimation framework used.  
3.7 Conclusion 
 Latin America is still experiencing varying levels and types of political 
instability and at the same time many countries have not reduced their dependence 
on primary commodity exports. There is a possibility that the region’s reliance on 
revenue from commodity exports could be an influential factor in the region’s 
political stability. This paper studies how the commodity prices of the top twenty 
five Latin American commodities affect the probability of political instability. 
Using four different types of political instability, I test whether commodity prices 
have an effect on the various types of instability.  
The results show that commodity prices influence the probability of 
political instability. However, the direction and magnitude of the effect depends on 
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the measure of political instability.  Based on the result from a probit model, I find 
that increases in a country’s total commodity price index, increases the probability 
of anti-government demonstrations but decreases the probability of government 
crises and riots. However, this index is too aggregate to see if specific types of 
commodities are more prone to instability than others. The results when 
disaggregating each country’s commodity price index into point source 
commodities and diffuse commodities are similar to the results when using the total 
commodity price index with the exception that assassinations are sensitive to 
increases in the point source price index but not in the diffuse price index. These 
results are similar to the results when using a count model. Further disaggregation 
of the point source commodities into its mineral and agricultural components reveal 
that the point source effect is driven primarily by increases in mineral prices with 
the exception of agricultural prices affecting the probability of anti-government 
demonstrations.  
The finding that commodity prices affect the political stability of the region 
is important in the formulation of policy. The most important take-away for 
policymakers is that not all commodities affect stability in the same way. In fact, 
since increases in diffuse commodity prices have a mostly mitigating effect on 
instability, policymakers may be able to exploit this information. It may be in the 
country’s interest to establish price stabilizing policies in the agricultural sector in 
order to reduce unrest. As for policies addressing potential instability from point 
source commodities, the evidence in this paper suggests that prices for these 
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commodities, especially the mineral commodities, could affect instability in either 
direction. This makes it difficult to formulate a policy to generally preempt 





Table 3.6: Definition of Instability Variables 
 
 
Table3. 7: Commodity Price Indexes – Component Commodities 
Table 3.2: Commodity Price Indexes – Component Commodities 








“those relying primarily on 
livestock and agricultural produce 





Point Source  
“those extracted from a narrow 
geographic or economic base, 
such as oil, minerals, and 
plantation crops (such as sugar 
and bananas)”* 
- Antimony  
- Copper 
- Gold 

















Note: The price indexes for each country are based only on the commodities that are produce in 
that country.  




Table 3.1:  




“Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for 
the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their 
opposition to government policies or authority, 
excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign 
nature.” 
Assassinations “Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder 
of a high government official or politician.” 
Government 
Crises 
“Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring 
the downfall of the present regime – excluding situations 
of revolt aimed at such overthrow.” 
Riots “Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 
citizens involving the use of physical force.” 
Source: Cross National Time Series Data (Banks, 2011) 
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Table 3.8a: Summary Statistics For Commodity Price Indexes 
Table 3.9b: Summary Statistics For Other Covariates and Instability Measures 
Table 3.3a 
Summary Statistics For Commodity Price Indexes 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Price Index  59.609 39.176 4.653 285.28 
 Diffuse Price Index  11.572 26.039 0 146.445 
 Point Source Price Index 48.379 39.719 0 285.28 
- Mineral Price Index 17.717 25.684 0 163.14 
- Agricultural Price Index 29.347 29.448 0 157.63 
 
 
    
Table 3.3b 
Summary Statistics For Other Covariates and Instability Measures 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Anti-Government Demonstrations 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Assassinations 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Government Crises 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Riots 0.312 0.464 0 1 
Neighborhood  
    
Anti-Govt. Demonstrations 0.543 0.498 0 1 
Assassinations 0.449 0.498 0 1 
Govt. Crises 0.484 0.5 0 1 
Riots 0.612 0.488 0 1 
Democracy 0.477 0.5 0 1 
Population 15072 25274 580 167988 
Inflation 13.704 18.944 -42.321 99.313 
GDP Growth 1.608 5.177 -22.285 28.346 




Table 3.10: Marginal Effects From Probit Regression Using the Aggregate Commodity Price Index 
Table 3.4  
Marginal Effects From Probit Regression  








Total PI 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Neighborhood 0.089*** 0.079*** 0.125*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) 
Democracy 0.098*** 0.076*** 0.060** 0.094*** 
 
(0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) 
Inflation -0.000 0.001** 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth GDP -0.005* -0.002 -0.005** -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Population 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
χ
2 
(1) 154.686*** 131.783*** 135.077*** 163.744*** 
Note: N = 1146 for all regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at 







Table 3.11a: Marginal Effects From Probit Regression Using the Point Source and Diffuse Price Indexes 
Table 3.12b: Marginal Effects From Probit Regression Using the Diffuse and Disaggregated Pt. Source Prices Index 
Table 3.5a 
Marginal Effects From Probit Regression   








Pt. Source PI 0.002*** 0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Diffuse PI 0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
        
χ
2 
(1) 155.448*** 137.388*** 136.286*** 163.379*** 
     Table 3.5b 
Marginal Effects From Probit Regression  









    
Mineral PI 0.001 0.001* -0.002** -0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Agricultural  PI 0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Diffuse PI 0.002** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002* 
 







(1) 155.786*** 137.944*** 137.978*** 164.959*** 
Note: N = 1146 for all regressions. All controls discussed in Section 3.4.4 are included. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 






ble 3.13a: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Marginal Effects Using the Point Source and Diffuse Price Indexes 
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Table 3.6  
Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Marginal Effects 
Using the Point Source and Diffuse Price Indexes 
 
Panel A 
Negative Binomial Component 
 Anti-Govt. 
Demonstrations 
Assassinations Govt. Crises Riots 
Pt. Source PI 0.008*** 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diffuse PI 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 











Pt. Source PI -0.023** 0.020* 0.019 0.001 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.006) 
Diffuse PI 0.005 0.071*** 0.054** 0.032*** 
 













3.58***  4.21*** 1.52* 4.00*** 
Note: N = 1146 for all regressions. All controls discussed in Section 3.4.4 are included. Country 
fixed effects are not included. Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level. 
a
Chi-Squared Statistic for the likelihood ratio test compares the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
model with the Zero-Inflated Poisson Model. A significant statistic implies that there is 
overdispersion and the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial is the appropriate technique. 
b
The Vuong test compares the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model with the Negative 
Binomial Model. A significant statistic implies the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial is a better fit 
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
Chapter 1 Data Sources 
Lower and Upper Chamber Election Rules: pr, plurality, appointed, or indirectly 
elected 
- Database of Political Institutions 2009 - (Beck et al., 2001) 
- Elections in the Americas - (Nohlen, 2005) 
- The Statesman’s Yearbook  
- Country Profiles - (U.S. Department of State, 2010)  
Chamber Size: unicameral, lower, and upper chamber sizes 
- The Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset - (Henisz, 2010) 
- Elections in the Americas - (Nohlen, 2005) 
- Inter-Parliamentary Union - (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2010) 
- The Statesman’s Yearbook  
- Country Profiles - (U.S. Department of State, 2010) 
Legislative Structure: Unicameral or Bicameral 
- Constitutions of the World - (Maddex, 2008) 
- Elections in the Americas - (Nohlen, 2005) 
- Inter-Parliamentary Union - (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2010) 
- The Statesman’s Yearbook  
- Country Profiles - (U.S. Department of State, 2010) 
Other Variables:  
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- Democracy and Political System (Presidential, Parliamentary, or Mixed): 
Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited - (Cheibub et al.,  2010) 
- Government consumption, openness, share of real GDP per capita, real GDP 
per capita, population and population growth - Penn World Tables - (Heston 
et al.,  2009) 
- % of population ages 0-14 and % of population ages 65 and above.  (World 
Bank, 2011) 
- Legal Origins – English Common Law, French Civil Law, German, and 
Scandinavian (La Porta et al., 2008) 
- Military Expenditure – Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities 
(Singer et al., 1972) and from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) . 
Chapter 2 Data Sources 
Dependent Variable: 
- Log of GDP per capita: Log of GDP per Capita in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars. The data can be accessed at http://www. ggdc. net/maddison/ 
Geography Variables: 
- Landlocked Dummy: Dummy variable equal to if country is completely 
surrounded by land. 
- Absolute Latitude: Absolute Latitude divided by 90. It measures the 
approximate geographic centre of the country as listed in the CIA World 
Factbook.  
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- Percent Köppen-Geiger Tropics: Country Geography Data. This data was 




- Executive Constraint (EXCONST): The xconst variable from the Polity IV 
dataset. It captures “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision 
making powers of the chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities” 
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2009, p. 24). It ranges from 1 to 7 with a higher score 
indicating more constraints. We standardize the range to be between 0 and 1, 
with 1 being the most constrained. 
- Political Constraint (POLCON): “a measure of political constraints from a 
simple spatial model of political interaction that incorporates information on 
the number of independent branches of government with veto power and the 
distribution of preferences across and within those branches. ” From Henisz 
(2000).  
Chapter 3 Data Sources 
Commodity Price Data: 
- Petroleum - Oxford Latin American Economic History Database 
- Antimony, Gold, and Iron Ore – USGS 
- Soybean and Natural Gas - CRB Encyclopedia 
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- Sodium Nitrate and Quebracho Extract - US Department of Commerce - 
Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States  (United States 
Geological Survey, 2011) 
- All other commodity price data come from Grilli and Yang (1988) and the 
update by Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007). Full data was accessed at 
http://www.stephan-pfaffenzeller.com/cpi.html 
 
Country Commodity Export Data: 
- International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005 – (Mitchell, 
2007) 
- IMF-International Financial Yearbook – (International Monetary Fund, 
Various) 
Economic Data: 
- GDP and Population data comes from Angus Maddison’s Statistics on World 
Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP – (Maddison, 2010) 
- Inflation data – Calculated from the country CPIs from Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database ( Latin American Economic Center, 
2011) 
Political Variables: 
- Cross National Time Series Data Archive - (Banks, 2011) 




Appendix B: Chapter 1 List of Countries, Years, Chamber 
Structure, and Average Chamber Size 
Appendix B (Table 14): Chapter 1 List of Countries, Years, Chamber 
Structure, and Average Chamber Size 
N Country code 
year Chamber 
Structure 
Avg. Chamber Size 
start end Uni Lower Upper 
1 Albania ALB 1992 2007 Unicameral 144 0 0 
2 Argentina ARG 1984 2007 Bicameral 0 256 60 
3 Armenia ARM 1996 2007 Unicameral 146 0 0 
4 Australia AUS 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 142 72 
5 Austria AUT 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 183 63 
6 Bahamas BHS 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 43 16 
7 Bangladesh BGD 1987 2006 Unicameral 332 0 0 
8 Barbados BRB 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 27 21 
9 Belgium BEL 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 188 138 
10 Belize BLZ 1982 2007 Bicameral 0 28 8 
11 Benin BEN 1992 2007 Unicameral 79 0 0 
12 Bolivia BOL 1983 2007 Bicameral 0 129 27 
13 Brazil BRA 1985 2007 Bicameral 0 505 79 
14 Bulgaria BGR 1992 2007 Unicameral 240 0 0 
15 Canada CAN 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 291 105 
16 Cape Verde CPV 1992 2007 Unicameral 73 0 0 
17 Central African 
Rep. 
CAF 1993 2002 Unicameral 97 0 0 
18 Chile CHL 1990 2007 Bicameral 0 120 47 
19 Colombia COL 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 181 107 
20 Costa Rica CRI 1975 2007 Unicameral 57 0 0 
21 Croatia HRV 1993 2007 Bi/Uni 152 130 63 
22 Cyprus CYP 1983 2007 Unicameral 54 0 0 
23 Czech Rep. CZE 1993 2007 Uni/Bi 200 200 81 
24 Denmark DNK 1975 2007 Unicameral 179 0 0 
25 Dominican Rep. DOM 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 126 29 
26 Ecuador ECU 1980 1999 Unicameral 78 0 0 
27 El Salvador SLV 1984 2007 Unicameral 77 0 0 
28 Estonia EST 1993 2007 Unicameral 101 0 0 
29 Finland FIN 1975 2007 Unicameral 200 0 0 
30 France FRA 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 548 313 
31 Germany, West DEU 1975 1989 Bicameral 0 496 45 
32 Germany DEU 1991 2007 Bicameral 0 643 69 
33 Ghana GHA 1993 2007 Unicameral 208 0 0 
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N Country code 
year Chamber 
Structure 
Avg. Chamber Size 
start end Uni Lower Upper 
34 Greece GRC 1975 2007 Unicameral 300 0 0 
35 Grenada GRD 1985 2007 Bicameral 0 15 13 
36 Guatemala GTM 1986 2007 Unicameral 114 0 0 
37 Honduras HND 1982 2007 Unicameral 122 0 0 
38 Hungary HUN 1991 2007 Unicameral 386 0 0 
39 Iceland ISL 1975 2007 Bi/Uni 63 41 20 
40 India IND 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 542 230 
41 Indonesia IDN 1999 2007 Unicameral 491 0 0 
42 Ireland IRL 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 162 60 
43 Israel ISR 1975 2007 Unicameral 120 0 0 
44 Italy ITA 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 630 325 
45 Jamaica JAM 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 60 21 
46 Japan JPN 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 502 252 
47 Kenya KEN 1998 2007 Unicameral 224 0 0 
48 Korea, Rep. of  KOR 1988 2007 Unicameral 293 0 0 
49 Latvia LVA 1994 2007 Unicameral 100 0 0 
50 Lithuania LTU 1994 2007 Unicameral 100 0 0 
51 Luxembourg LUX 1975 2007 Unicameral 60 0 0 
52 Macedonia MKD 1992 2007 Unicameral 120 0 0 
53 Madagascar MDG 1994 2007 Uni/Bi 143 149 82 
54 Malawi MWI 1995 2007 Unicameral 187 0 0 
55 Mali MLI 1993 2007 Unicameral 148 0 0 
56 Malta MLT 1975 2007 Unicameral 65 0 0 
57 Mauritius MUS 1975 2007 Unicameral 69 0 0 
58 Mexico MEX 2000 2007 Bicameral 0 500 128 
59 Moldova MDA 1994 2007 Unicameral 102 0 0 
60 Mongolia MNG 1993 2007 Unicameral 76 0 0 
61 Nepal NPL 1991 2001 Bicameral 0 196 60 
62 Netherlands NLD 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 150 75 
63 New Zealand NZL 1975 2007 Unicameral 102 0 0 
64 Nicaragua NIC 1987 2007 Unicameral 93 0 0 
65 Nigeria NGA 2000 2007 Bicameral 0 359 108 
66 Norway NOR 1975 2007 Unicameral 161 0 0 
67 Pakistan PAK 1989 1999 Bicameral 0 221 87 
68 Panama PAN 1989 2007 Unicameral 71 0 0 
69 Papua New 
Guinea 
PNG 1975 2007 Unicameral 108 0 0 
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70 Paraguay PRY 1990 2007 Bicameral 0 78 43 
71 Peru PER 1981 1990 Bicameral 0 180 60 
72 Philippines PHL 1988 2007 Bicameral 0 211 24 
73 Poland POL 1991 2007 Bicameral 0 460 100 
73 Poland POL 1991 2007 Bicameral 0 460 100 
74 Portugal PRT 1977 2007 Unicameral 241 0 0 
75 Romania ROM 1991 2007 Bicameral 0 346 138 
76 Saint Lucia LCA 1980 2007 Bicameral 0 18 11 
77 Sierra Leone SLE 1998 2007 Unicameral 90 0 0 
78 Slovak Rep. SVK 1993 2007 Unicameral 150 0 0 
79 Slovenia SVN 1992 2007 Bicameral 0 90 40 
80 Solomon Is. SLB 1979 2007 Unicameral 43 0 0 
81 Spain ESP 1978 2007 Bicameral 0 350 237 
82 Sri Lanka LKA 1989 2007 Unicameral 225 0 0 
83 Suriname SUR 1991 2007 Unicameral 51 0 0 
84 Sweden SWE 1975 2007 Unicameral 349 0 0 




TTO 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 36 31 
87 Turkey TUR 1984 2007 Unicameral 492 0 0 
88 Ukraine UKR 1994 2007 Unicameral 450 0 0 
89 United States USA 1975 2007 Bicameral 0 435 100 
90 Uruguay URY 1985 2007 Bicameral 0 99 31 
91 Vanuatu VUT 1981 2007 Unicameral 47 0 0 









Appendix C: Dates of Suffrage Expansion in Latin America 
Appendix C (Table 15): Dates of Suffrage Expansion in Latin America 
Country  Males
*
 Females Illiterates Secret Ballot 
Argentina 1912 1947 1912 1912 
Bolivia 1952 1952 1952 1952 
Brazil 1932 1932 1988 1932 
Chile 1925 1949 1970 1925 
Colombia 1936 1957 1936 1853 
Costa Rica 1913 1949 1913 1925 
Dominican Republic 1865 1942 1865 1865 
Ecuador 1861 1929 1978 1861 
El Salvador 1883 1939 1883 1950 
Guatemala 1879 1945 1956 1956 
Honduras 1894 1954 1894 1894 
Mexico 1857 1954 1857 1857 
Nicaragua 1893 1957 1893 1893 
Panama 1904 1945 1904 1946 
Paraguay 1870 1963 1870 1911 
Peru 1931 1955 1979 1931 
Uruguay 1918 1934 1934 1918 
Venezuela 1857 1946 1946 1946 
* These are the dates in which there were no economic requirements for male voters.  




Appendix D: Correlation Between Instruments and Institutions 
Appendix D (Table 16): Correlation Between Instruments and Institutions 
  EXCONST POLCON 
Male 0.5941 0.4953 
Male_All 0.6286 0.4968 
Female 0.5949 0.5392 
Universal 0.6362 0.5388 




Appendix E: List of Countries and Years in Chapter 3 
Appendix E (Table 17): Countries and Years 
  Country T Years Included 
1 Argentina 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
2 Bolivia 54 1947-2000 
3 Brazil 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
4 Chile 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
5 Colombia 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
6 Costa Rica 57 1938-1939, 1946-2000 
7 Dominican Republic 49 1952-2000 
8 Ecuador 55 1946-2000 
9 El Salvador 56 1939, 1946-2000 
10 Guatemala 56 1939, 1946-2000 
11 Honduras 57 1938-1939, 1946-2000 
12 Mexico 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
13 Nicaragua 56 1939, 1946-2000 
14 Panama 55 1946-2000 
15 Paraguay 55 1946-2000 
16 Peru 76 1919-1939, 1946-2000 
17 Uruguay 64 1931-1939, 1946-2000 




Appendix F: Count Model Discussion 
 
Using a count variable as the dependent variable opens up a new set of 
possibilities in terms of the estimation framework. The various political instability 
measures used in this study are count variables with distributions that are all 
skewed right and contain a large proportion of zeros. Poisson, Negative Binomial, 
and their Zero-Inflated counterparts are some of the estimation techniques that try 
to deal with these characteristics.  
The most widely used count models are Poisson and Negative Binomial. 
The Poisson distribution assumes that the mean and the variance are equal. 
Overdispersion in Poisson models occurs when the variance is greater than the 
mean. This violation of the distributional assumption may cause the estimates 
derived from a Poisson regression to be inefficient (Hilbe, 2007). The Negative 
Binomial model is an alternative approach that addresses the problem of 
overdispersion.   
In addition to the problem of overdispersion, there is a problem with the 
large number of zeros in the data. Because the percentage of zeros in the data 
ranges from 68% (riots) to 82% (assassinations), it can easily be said that there is 
an excess of zeros. The distributional assumptions of both Poisson and Negative 
Binomial are violated when there are a large proportion of zeros in the data. Their 
zero-inflated counterparts – Zero-Inflated Poisson and Zero-Inflated Negative 
Binomial – can accommodate the large amount of zeros in the data. These models 
assume that the structural zeros come from a binary distribution (such as probit or 
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logit) and the non-negative integer outcomes (including zeros) come from a count 
distribution (such as Poisson or Negative Binomial) (Hilbe, 2007).  
To accommodate the overdispersion in the data and the large number of 
zeros, I use the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial regression model.
82
 This model 
has a binary section and a count section. A logistic distribution is used for the 
binary part of the model. Within this framework, “success” is a prediction of being 
a zero count and “failure” a non-zero count. The log-likelihood function of the logit 
part of the model is: 
               
 
         
    
 
 
   
 
 
        
    
 
 
         





The count or Negative Binomial part models the non-negative integer outcomes 
which includes zeros. The log-likelihood function of the Negative Binomial part of 
the model is: 
                                                 
82
 I performed to tests on all regressions to see if this was the correct modeling framework. The first 
is the chi-squared statistic for the likelihood ratio test that compares Zero-Inflated Negative 
Binomial model with the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. The results support the use of Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial model over the Zero-Inflated Poisson model. The second statistic is for the 
Vuong test which compares the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial with the Negative Binomial. The 
results from this test support the use of Zero-Inflated over simple Negative Binomial. The test 
statistics for both test are reported along with the results in Table 3.6. These two tests should 
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Using this estimation framework, the regression equations take the following 
general form: 
                                                     
                         
where Instability is one of the instability count variables listed in Table 3.2. The 
first two right hand side variables are the point source and diffuse commodity price 
indexes that are unique to each country and year.  Controlsi,t-1 is a vector containing 
the control variables discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.4.4 .  
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Appendix G: Summary Statistics of Instability Variables in Count 
Model 












687 333 0.599 1.291 0 15 
Assassinations 566 213 0.494 1.712 0 25 
Govt. Crises 357 253 0.312 0.712 0 7 
Riots 689 358 0.601 1.280 0 15 
Note: All variables have 1146 observations 
  
  
  
 
 
 
